1. April 08, 2015 Agenda

Documents:

APRIL 08, 2015 AGENDA.PDF

2. Consideration Of The Minutes Of The March 11, 2015 Meeting Of The Charter Review Committee

Documents:

APRIL 08, 2015 CONSIDERATION OF THE MINUTES OF THE MARCH 11, 2015 MEETING OF THE CHARTER REVIEW COMMITTEE.PDF

3. Consideration And Discussion Of The Issue Of Whether Or Not To Recommend A Directly Elected Mayor Or Retain A City Council Selected Mayor; The Term And Term-Limit (If Any)

Documents:

APRIL 08, 2015 CONSIDERATION AND DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT TO RECOMMEND A DIRECTLY ELECTED MAYOR OR RETAIN A CITY COUNCIL.PDF

4. Consideration Of Charter Review Committee’s Calendar And Work Plan

Documents:

APRIL 08, 2015 CONSIDERATION OF CHARTER REVIEW COMMITTEES CALENDAR AND WORK PLAN.PDF

5. Committee Requests For Information Relating To The City Council Districts And Options

Documents:

APRIL 08, 2015 COMMITTEE REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION RELATING TO THE CITY COUNCIL DISTRICTS AND OPTIONS.PDF
City of San Buenaventura

CHARTER REVIEW COMMITTEE

John Baker, Member  Jerry Morris, Alternate
Cheryl Collart, Member  Ross R. Olney, Member
Barbara Evans, Member  Dennis Orrock, Chair
Peter A. Goldenring, Member  Andrew Prokopow, Member
Lynn Jacobs, Vice-Chair  Patrick Squires, Member
Suz Montgomery, Member  Chris Stephens, Member

AGENDA

REGULAR MEETING
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 8, 2015, 4:00 P.M.
CITY HALL, 501 POLI STREET, VENTURA
SANTA CRUZ CONFERENCE ROOM

ROLL CALL

INFORMATION ITEMS

None.

FORMAL ITEMS

1. **Consideration of the Minutes of the March 11, 2015 Meeting of the Charter Review Committee**

   **RECOMMENDATION**

   Approve the Minutes of March 11, 2015 as submitted by the City Clerk.

2. **Consideration and Discussion of the Issue of Whether or Not to Recommend a Directly Elected Mayor or Retain a City Council Selected Mayor; the Term and Term-Limit (if any)**

   **RECOMMENDATION**

   That the Charter Review Committee take action as it deems appropriate.
3. **Consideration of Charter Review Committee’s Calendar and Work Plan**

**RECOMMENDATION**

That the Charter Review Committee take action as it deems appropriate.

4. **Committee Requests for Information Relating to the City Council Districts and Options**

**RECOMMENDATION**

Members of the City Charter Review Committee may indicate the types of information that they would find useful and/or helpful in determining and preparing for the May 13 and June 10, 2015 Charter Review Committee Meetings where the topic is scheduled to be whether or not the City should change its current at-large method of electing Members of the City Council to City Council Districts where candidates run only in the district they live and are voted on only by voters in that District and what other options are available.

**PUBLIC COMMUNICATIONS**

**COMMITTEE MEMBER COMMUNICATIONS**

**ADJOURNMENT**

Administrative Reports relating to this agenda are available in the City Clerk's Office, 501 Poli Street – Room 204, Ventura, during normal business hours. Materials related to an agenda item submitted after distribution of the agenda packet are available for public review in the City Clerk’s Office.

This agenda was posted on Thursday, April 2, 2015, at 4:00 p.m. in the City Clerk’s Office and on the City Hall Public Notices Board.

In compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, if you need special assistance to participate in this meeting, please contact the City Clerk’s Office at 658-4787 or the California Relay Service. Notification by Monday, April 6, 2015, by 12:00 p.m. will enable the City to make reasonable arrangements to ensure accessibility to this meeting.

Copies of this and all Agendas of the Charter Commission are available on the City’s website at:

http://www.cityofventura.net/page/public-meetings

To be added to the interested persons list for future announcements and information regarding the Charter Review Committee. Please email charterreviewcommittee@ci.ventura.ca.us with your contact information and you will be added to the list.

April 8, 2015

Charter Review Committee Agenda
MINUTES

MARCH 11, 2015

The Charter Review Committee met in regular session in the City Hall Santa Cruz Conference Room, 501 Poli Street, Ventura at 4:02 p.m.

ROLL CALL

Present: Members Baker, Evans, Goldenring, Montgomery, Alternate Morris, Olney, Prokopow, Squires, Vice Chair Jacobs, and Chair Orrock.

Absent: Members Collart and Stephens.

Chair Orrock presided.

FORMAL ITEMS

1. Consideration of the Minutes of the February 11, 2015 Meeting of the Charter Review Committee

RECOMMENDATION

Approve the Minutes of February 11, 2015 as submitted by the City Clerk.

Members Collart and Stephens arrived at 4:05 p.m.

Member Goldenring moved to amend and approve the minutes of February 11, 2015, to reflect a regular session. Member Squires seconded. The vote was as follows:


NOES: None.
ABSTAIN: Member Montgomery, Vice Chair Jacobs, and Chair Orrock.

ABSENT: None.

Chair Orrock declared the motion carried.

2. **Consideration and Discussion of the Issue of Retaining or Removing Provisions Relating to the School District from the Charter**

**RECOMMENDATION**

That the Charter Review Committee take action as it deems appropriate. However, if the Charter Review Committee determines to recommend retaining the current Charter language pertaining to the School District, the City Attorney recommends removing the requirement that School Board members be elected at-large.

**SPEAKERS**

Members of the public: Debbie Golden, Board of Education Member and Joe Richards, Assistant Superintendent, Ventura Unified School District.

Vice Chair Jacobs moved to recommend that the Board of Education be removed from the City Charter subject to receiving feedback from the Board of Education members. Member Prokopow seconded. The vote was as follows:

AYES: Members Baker, Collart, Evans, Goldenring, Montgomery, Olney, Prokopow, Squires, Stephens, Vice Chair Jacobs, and Chair Orrock.

NOES: None.

ABSENT: None.

Chair Orrock declared the motion carried.

3. **Consideration of Items Requested to be Researched on Consultants and Additions to the Charter Review Committee’s Scope**

**RECOMMENDATION:**

That the Charter Review Committee review and discuss the information below and take action as the Committee deems appropriate.
Member Goldenring moved to direct the Chair to return to the City Council for clarification regarding the charge related to districts, requesting clarification as to whether the Committee is inclined to explore the issue of districts, and if the City Council is expecting recommendations on forms of implementation; and request authorization to hire a consultant for a not-to-exceed amount of $7,500 to assist the Committee on this issue. Vice Chair Jacobs seconded. The vote was as follows:

**AYES:** Members Baker, Collart, Evans, Goldenring, Montgomery, Squires, Stephens, Vice Chair Jacobs, and Chair Orrock.

**NOES:** Members Olney and Prokopow.

**ABSENT:** None.

Chair Orrock declared the motion carried.

Vice Chair Jacobs moved to recommend adding to the list of potential charter amendments the issue of residency for members of the City Council and the City Manager to conform with current state law. Member Montgomery seconded. The vote was as follows:

**AYES:** Members Baker, Collart, Evans, Goldenring, Montgomery, Olney, Prokopow, Squires, Stephens, Vice Chair Jacobs, and Chair Orrock.

**NOES:** None.

**ABSENT:** None.

Chair Orrock declared the motion carried.

4. **Committee Requests for Information Relating to the Direct Election of the Mayor and Any Term-Limits Applicable Thereto**

**RECOMMENDATION**

Members of the Charter Review Committee may indicate the types of information that they would find useful and/or helpful in preparing for the April 8, 2015 Charter Review Committee Meeting where the topic is scheduled to be whether or not the City should have a directly elected Mayor, the term, and term-limit (if any) for the Mayor. Also included will be consideration of the Deputy Mayor's position, term, and term-limit (if any).

Member Prokopow moved to direct the City Attorney's Office to survey 10 cities of population between 100,000 and 150,000 to see if they have directly elected Mayors,
succession related to the Deputy Mayor and Mayor seats, and information on Mayoral duties. Vice Chair Jacobs seconded. The vote was as follows:

AYES: Members Baker, Collart, Evans, Goldenring, Montgomery, Olney, Prokopow, Squires, Stephens, Vice Chair Jacobs, and Chair Orrock.

NOES: None.

ABSENT: None.

Chair Orrock declared the motion carried.

5. Committee Requests for Information Relating to the City Council Districts and Options

RECOMMENDATION

Members of the City Charter Review Committee may indicate the types of information that they would find useful and/or helpful in determining and preparing for the May 13 and June 10, 2015 Charter Review Committee Meetings where the topic is scheduled to be whether or not the City should change its current at-large method of electing Members of the City Council to City Council Districts where candidates run only in the district they live and are voted on only by voters in that District and what other options are available.

This item was discussed under Agenda Item No. 3.

PUBLIC COMMUNICATIONS

SPEAKERS

Member of the public: Mark Abbe.

ADJOURNMENT

Member Prokopow moved to adjourn the meeting at 5:06 p.m. Member Stephens seconded. The vote was as follows:

AYES: Members Baker, Collart, Evans, Goldenring, Montgomery, Olney, Prokopow, Squires, Stephens, Vice Chair Jacobs, and Chair Orrock.

NOES: None.

ABSENT: None.
Chair Orrock declared the motion carried.
DATE: 3/31/2015
TO: Charter Review Committee
FROM: Gregory G. Diaz, City Attorney
SUBJECT: Consideration and Discussion of the Issue of Whether or Not to Recommend a Directly Elected Mayor or Retain a City Council Selected Mayor; the Term and Term-Limit (if any)

RECOMMENDATION:

That the Charter Review Committee take action as it deems appropriate.

DISCUSSION

The issue for discussion and potential decision at this meeting is whether or not the City of San Buenaventura should retain its current method of selecting its Mayor, i.e., the City Council selects the Mayor from among its members and the mayor serves a two year term as Mayor, or should the City switch to a directly elected Mayor where the voters of the City determine who is the Mayor? As background, the San Buenaventura City Charter, Section 702, provides as follows:

"The Council shall elect from among its members, officers of the City who shall have the titles of Mayor and Deputy Mayor, each of whom shall serve a two-year term. In no event may a Councilmember elected Mayor for a two-year term, succeed himself as Mayor without at least one additional two-year term having lapsed.

The Mayor shall preside over the sessions of the Council, shall sign official documents when the signature of the Council or Mayor is required by law and shall act as the official head of the City on public and ceremonial occasions. He shall have the power to administer oaths and affirmations, but shall have no power of veto. He shall have authority to preserve order at all Council meetings and to
remove any person from any meeting of the Council for disorderly conduct, to enforce the rules of the Council and to determine the order of business under the rules of the Council. The Deputy Mayor shall act as Mayor in the absence or disability of the Mayor.

When the Mayor and the Deputy Mayor are absent from any meeting of the Council, the members of the Council may choose another member to act as Mayor pro tem, who shall, for the time being, have the powers of the Mayor.”

General Law Cities – Mayoral Selection; Powers and Duties

City Council Selection

In general law cities, the mayor can be selected in one of two ways. The first is by selection by the city council from among one of its members. The position of mayor pro tempore is also selected in the same manner and generally at the same time.

Powers and Duties of Mayor Selected by the City Council

Mayors of general law cities that are selected by their city councils serve as the presiding officer for all city council meetings but retain their rights and privileges as a member of the city council and specifically can make or second any motion and vote on any issue before the city council. The mayor of a general law city selected by their city council also shall sign all of the following:

- All warrants drawn on the city’s treasury;
- All written contracts and conveyances made or entered into by the city; and,
- All instruments requiring the city seal.

The city council may enact an ordinance delegating this function to an officer other than the mayor. Furthermore, the mayor of a general law city selected by the city council is authorized to administer to oaths and affirmations, take affidavits, and certify them. Finally, the mayor of a general law city selected by the city council may also

\[1\] Government Code Section 36801.
\[2\] Government Code Section 36802.
\[3\] Government Code Section 36803.
\[4\] Government Code Section 40602.
\[5\] Government Code Section 40603.
acknowledge the execution of all instruments executed by the city and required to be acknowledged.  

**Direct Election**

The second way mayors can be selected in general law cities is to be directly elected by the voters. In order to change from a city council selected to a directly elected mayor, the city council needs to submit a measure to the voters. The issue before the voters is initially “shall the electors elect a mayor and four city council members?” The questions before the voters also includes whether the mayor should serve a two or four year term, with the term length being determined by which option receives the highest number of votes.

**Powers and Duties of Directly Elected Mayors**

A directly elected mayor of a general law has the same powers and duties as a mayor of a general law city selected by the city council. In addition, a directly elected mayor of a general law city retains his/her position on the city council with all of the powers and duties associated with being a member of the city council. A directly elected mayor of a general law city also has the authority, with the approval of the city council, to make all appointments to boards, commissions, and committees unless a statute provides otherwise.

**Charter Cities-- Mayoral Selection: Powers and Duties**

In charter cities, the selection of the mayor is determined by the provisions of the charter. In the absence of a specific provision in either the charter or municipal code on the selection of the mayor, the general laws would apply. Consequently, charter cities can have a variety of methods to determine who serves as the mayor and for how long. In the San Buenaventura Charter, the Mayor is selected from among the City Council by the City Council, similar to how a general law city that uses the council selection method. However, unlike a general law city, the San Buenaventura Charter provides that the Mayor’s term is two years. The term of the mayor selected by the city council of a general law city is usually one year. In addition, the San Buenaventura Charter also limits the Mayor from succeeding him/herself as Mayor until two years or more have elapsed. A copy of the survey charter cities also attached at Exhibit “1” reflecting if the

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7 Government Code Sections 34900 and 34901.
8 Government Code Section 34903.
9 Government Code Section 40605.
10 San Buenaventura Charter, Section 702
mayors in those cities are selected by the city council or directly elected by the voters of that city. In addition, the Exhibit also shows the term and term-limit, if any, applicable to the mayor for each of the survey charter cities.

In addition to the two models for selection of the mayor applicable to general law cities, charter cities can utilize other options as well. For example, a charter city could have a charter provision that requires the direct election of the mayor by the voters, but requires that to be eligible to run for mayor, a candidate must be a current member of the city council. Similarly, a charter could also provide for a different term of office for the mayor, i.e., one year, three years, five years, etc. The only limitation on variations for how the mayor is selected would be the same ones applicable to process and eligibility to run for office generally under the constitution and laws of the state. For example, only allowing candidates from one part of the city to vote for mayor would not likely stand constitutional challenge nor would a requirement that a candidate for mayor be 30 years of age or more. This is not based on the charter power, but constitutional provisions pertaining to eligibility for public office.

Powers and Duties of Mayors in Charter Cities

The charter is both a grant of power and a limitation on power. It is also the document that clarifies who has the authority to exercise what powers. Consequently, a mayor of a charter city would have the same powers and duties of a mayor in a general law city, be it a mayor selected by the city council or one directly elected, unless the charter provided otherwise. For example, a charter could severely limit the power to execute city documents by specifying that the city manager is to take on this function. In cities with an elected treasurer, a charter could specify that the treasurer is to sign all warrants on behalf of the city.

On the opposite side, a charter could expand the role of the mayor. A charter provision could be drafted that gives the mayor veto power over legislative actions (generally city ordinances) enacted by the city council. A charter provision could make the appointment and removal of the city manager a right and power of the mayor alone. Charter cities, unlike general law cities, also have the authority to have a "strong mayor" form of government. This varies significantly from the council-manager form of government because the executive in charge of the day to day functions of the city is not a professional manager, but an elected official. This is the minority form of local government in California with only some of the largest and smallest cities utilizing it. To the extent the strong mayor form of government is used, it is used in varying degrees. Los Angeles and San Diego are frequently cited as examples of the strong mayor form of government. What differs in these cities is that the mayor is the chief

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12 The City of Fresno has such a provision in its charter and consequently, the tenure of a city manager in Fresno has historically been limited to the term of the mayor—if not less.
executive and not a member of the city council. They do not preside over the meetings and have no vote on the city council. They may have certain veto rights. They may submit the budget. Other cities with a less strong mayor, for example Fresno and Long Beach, have a hybrid system. For example, in Fresno, the Mayor is not part of the city council, does not conduct the meetings, and has no vote. Whereas in Long Beach, the Mayor is the presiding officer of the city council but does not have a vote on the city council. Both have limited veto powers. Consequently, there are a variety of ways to structure the powers and duties of the mayor. What matters most is what the community believes is the best form of government for it—with divisions of labor and divisions of power that best serve the public interest.

In deciding what powers and duties to assign to the mayor, care should be given to avoid over dispersion of power so that there is no accountability. This was cited as one of the primary factors causing the bankruptcy of the City of San Bernardino. The case study notes that the San Bernardino City Charter has a very unusual structure that diffused political and managerial accountability and authority. For example, the mayor nominates the city manager, police chief, and fire chiefs, but a majority of the city council must approve the nominations. The city manager reports to the mayor but can only be removed by a petition submitted by the mayor to the city council and a majority vote of the city council is required for the city manager to be removed. Department heads, including the police and fire chiefs report to the city manager but can only be removed by the city council. The city attorney is an elected position. The mayor has veto authority over any city council actions without a supermajority override. No one person or body has full authority to execute decisions. The case study found that, "[a]t best, this complex arrangement makes efficient governance difficult. As worst, the competing interests means the status quo—even when detrimental to the city as a whole—is very difficult to shift."14

To provide the Charter Review Committee with some idea of the powers and duties assigned to mayors in charter cities, I have attached as Exhibit "2" a copy of the pages setting forth the duties of the mayor in each of the survey charter cities that we have used in the past. Should a survey city be missing from the Exhibit, it is because that city's charter does not provide for any additional duties or limitations on the power of the mayor other than general law.

14 The discussion above is taken in large part from an as yet unpublished chapter of a publication undertaken by the City Attorneys' Department of the League of California Cities on charter cities. This portion of the chapter was authored by Kathy Phelan then of the law firm of Alshire and Wynder. The City Attorney co-authored the other parts of the chapter called "Common Concerns."
At the last Charter Review Committee meeting, a member requested that staff survey at least ten cities between 100,000 and 150,000 to determine if these cities selected their mayor by the city council from the city council or directly elected them. Because the number of cities in this category was not overly extensive and most of the information was readily available from their website, my office was able to survey all California cities within that population range. To assist the Charter Review Committee with understanding the data, staff has also included a column indicating if the city is a general law or a charter city. A copy of this survey can be found in Exhibit “3” hereto.

Some Reasons to Retain the City Council Selected Mayor

The following is a discussion of some of the reasons the Charter Review Committee may wish to retain the current process to select the Mayor. However, this discussion includes only some of the reasons and the Members of the Committee may have others that are not listed or discussed that are equally or more valid than those provided by staff. Some reasons to retain the current system:

- Having the City Council select the Mayor ensures that the City Council, at least at the time of selection, has confidence in their choice to serve in this office. The Mayor’s position has certain duties outlined in the Charter, Municipal Code, and those set forth in state law discussed earlier, but the difference between individuals serving as Mayor has a lot to do with their influence on the policy making process. Is the Mayor viewed by his/her colleagues as a leader? Is the Mayor someone the City Council as a whole trusts? The leadership ability of the Mayor (or the lack of it) will have a dramatic impact on the policy making process in the City. A City Council selected Mayor helps ensure that the person selected as the Mayor works well with his/her colleagues and reflects the majority opinion on the City Council.

- The legal power and duties of a Mayor in a council/manager city are compared and contrasted with the influence and situational authority of mayors are discussed in two excellent articles, “Mayoral Leadership in Council-Manager Cities: Preconditions versus Preconceptions,” published by the Cambridge University Press, Southern Political Science Association and “The Policy Making Role of the Mayor in Council-Manager Cities: Detracting and Enhancing Factors” a MPA Student Capstone from the University of Nebraska, Omaha, Summer of 2007, copies attached as Exhibits “4” and “5” hereto.

- Allows the City Council to ensure that the person occupying the office of Mayor has the experience necessary to do so. In contrast, a directly elected Mayor could have no governmental or municipal experience. This can make it challenging for the City Council to get its work accomplished and lack of experience at running public meetings can make them long, unruly, and unpleasant for the Council, staff, and public to attend.
• It is less expensive in terms of election-related costs than directly electing the Mayor. The City is charged by the Ventura County Registrar of Voters the City's proportionate shall of the election costs whenever a City office or measure is on the ballot. If the City is only electing "Council Members" then only one office is charged. If, however, the City is electing three Council Members and a Mayor, the City pays the cost to have two offices on the ballot. This will raise the City's election related costs. Because the size of the ballot varies significantly in each election, it is difficult to estimate increase in election costs.

Some Reasons to Switch to a Directly Elected Mayor

Below are some of the reasons the Committee may wish to recommend switching to a directly elected Mayor. As indicated above, this is not intended to be an exhaustive list, but some key factors to consider. It is likely the Committee will have other reasons that are equally or more valid. Some of the reasons to switch to a directly elected Mayor include:

• It allows the voters in the City to decide who holds the most prominent and visible local government position in the City. In essence, this argument is that allowing the voters to decide who is the Mayor, the selection process is more democratic than having the City Council decide.
• In the event the Committee determines to go to City Council districts, having a Mayor elected at-large from the whole City will ensure that at least one of the elected officials is accountable for looking after the interests of the entire City and not just his/her district.
• A directly elected Mayor carries with him/her the mantle of voter support or approval when representing the City with state and national political leaders.

Appropriate Length of the Term for the Mayor

As a charter city, San Buenaventura has the ability to set the length of the term of the Mayor as it deems to be in the best interests of the City. General Law cities really have three options: a one year term when the mayor is selected by the city council, a two year term when selected by the voters, or a four year term when selected by the voters. For purposes of this Administrative Report, staff will discuss issues associated with two and four year terms.

Two Year Terms

The advantage of a two year term is that it is long enough for a Mayor to learn the ropes and get a handle on running difficult public meetings. Mayors can establish an agenda and even get a number of projects underway during a two year term. This is true without regards to whether or not the Mayor is directly elected or selected by the
City Council. The disadvantage of a two year term if the Mayor is directly elected is the increase in election costs to the City (i.e., there will always be at least two offices on the ballot rather than just one) and it could lead to political instability by always having a majority of the City Council up for election at every City Council election. It could be argued that it will force the City Council to take a short-term view of issues rather than a long-term view that may be in the City's best interests. Others will argue that a two year term will hold the Mayor accountable to the voters. The current Charter provides for a two year term for the Mayor when selected by the City Council, but is silent on any removal authority should a Mayor selected by the City Council lose the confidence of the City Council.

Four Year Term

If directly elected, a Mayor with a four year term certainly has the time to learn the ropes and how to run difficult meetings. A longer term would also allow him/her to set a policy agenda that has a realistic opportunity to be enacted while he/she is still Mayor. A four year term has the advantage of not always having a majority of the City Council up for election thus providing the opportunity for political stability. Both job applicants and businesses look for communities to locate in where the political environment is stable as certainty or predictability is favored over uncertainty and instability. From a cost perspective, a four year for a directly elected mayor is less costly because the City would face half the number of elections; it is more costly than a city council selected mayor. A directly elected Mayor who is unpopular with the City Council can make for a long four years for the Mayor, City Council, staff, and community while the factions attempt to work out differences.

CONCLUSION

One thing that is clear from the discussion above, there are a lot of issues and options for the Committee to consider. There is not one right or correct approach, there is only an approach that you believe is in the community's best interests. Staff looks forward to hearing your discussion and learning of your recommendations in this area.

EXHIBITS

Exhibit 1 – Survey Charter Cities: Directly Elected or City Council Selected Mayor, Term, and Term-Limit
Exhibit 2 – Survey Charter Cities: Copies of Charter Provisions Regarding Powers and Duties of the Mayor
Exhibit 3 -- California Cities with 100,000 to 150,000 Population and Directly Elected or City Council Selected Mayor
Exhibit 4 -- Article: “Mayoral Leadership in Council-Manager Cities”
Exhibit 5 -- Article: “Policy Making Role of the Mayor in Council-Manager Cities”
## Sample Charter Cities
### Directly Elected Mayor
#### Mayor/City Council Term Limits

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Charter City</th>
<th>Mayor Direct Elect (D) City Council Select (C)</th>
<th>Mayor Term-Limit?</th>
<th>What is the Limit?</th>
<th>Life-Time Limit?</th>
<th>Mayor Term Length?</th>
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\(^1\) Requires 4 year period intervening between last term and new one once limit reached, Modesto Charter Section 503.

\(^2\) Requires break in Service – Charter is silent on length of time.

\(^3\) Requires 2 year period intervening between last term and new one once limit reached, Santa Clara Charter Section 701.
PROVISIONS PERTAINING TO THE MAYOR FROM SURVEY CHARTER CITIES CHARTERS\(^1\)

\(^1\) In the event a survey city's charter provisions are not included, it is because their charter does not have specific language relating to the powers and duties of the mayor.

EXHIBIT "2"
ARTICLE VI.
THE MAYOR

Section 21. The Mayor's powers.
The Mayor shall be the chairman of the Council, and shall preside at the meetings of the Council and perform such other duties consistent with his or her office as may be imposed by the Council. He or she shall be entitled to a vote on all matters coming before the Council, but shall possess no veto power. He or she shall be recognized as the official head of the City for all ceremonial purposes, by the courts for the purposes of serving civil processes, and by the Governor for military purpose. He or she may use the title of Mayor in any case in which the execution of contracts or other legal instruments in writing, or other necessity arising from the general laws of this State, may so require; but this shall not be construed as conferring upon him or her administrative or judicial functions or other powers or functions of a Mayor, under the general laws of the State. The powers and duties of the Mayor shall be such as are conferred upon him or her by this amendment, together with such others as may be conferred by the Council in the pursuance of the provisions of this amendment, and no others.

Section 22. Mayor pro tempore.
During the temporary absence or disability of the Mayor, the Vice-President of the Council shall act as Mayor pro tempore. In case of the temporary absence or disability of both the Mayor and Vice-President the Council shall elect one of its members to be Mayor pro tempore. In case of vacancy in the office of Mayor, the Vice-President of the Council shall act as Mayor until such vacancy can be filled as provided in this Charter.

Section 23. (repealed)

Section 24. Mayor to have City's books examined.
The Mayor shall employ, for a stipulated compensation, at the beginning of each fiscal year, a certified public accountant, who shall examine, at least once during the year, the books, records and reports of the Auditor and of all officers and employees who receive or disburse City moneys, and the books, records and reports of such other officers and departments as the Mayor may direct, and annually, after the close of each fiscal year, make a report of such examination. Such report shall be presented to the Mayor and copies thereof shall be filed with the Auditor, City Manager and City Clerk. Such accountant shall have unlimited privilege of investigation, to examine under oath or otherwise all officers, clerks and employees of the City, and every such officer, clerk and employee shall give all required assistance and information to such accountant, and submit to him or her for examination such books and papers of his or her office as may be requested, and failure to do so shall be deemed and held to be a forfeiture and abandonment of his or her office. The Council shall provide for the payment of the services of such accountant.

Sections 25 and 26. (repealed)
chair will be designated as the councilmember representing the district with the same numerical
designation in the districting plan whether or not that councilmember lives in the district. For
example, upon adoption of the first districting plan, the councilmember occupying Chair One will
be designated the councilmember representing District One whether or not that councilmember
lives in District One. Each of the councilmembers occupying office at the time of the effective date
of this Charter revision shall be so designated. Thereafter, the first district elections for Districts
Two, Four and Five shall occur during the municipal election in 2009 and the first district elections
for District One, Three, and Six shall occur during the municipal election in 2011. Notwithstanding
the provisions of Section 700 of the Charter, an incumbent councilmember at the time of the
effective date of this provision may run for a Council seat other than the seat which that member
currently holds if the councilmember is otherwise eligible to run in that seat, all subject to the
limitations of terms of office in Section 503 of this Charter.


SECTION 502. - COUNCIL VACANCIES.
Except as set forth in the next sentence, the provisions of Section 1770 of the Government Code of the
State of California as they now exist or may hereafter be amended shall govern the existence of a
vacancy.

In addition, a vacancy on the Council shall also exist if any member, including the Mayor, is absent for
any reason from twelve consecutive regular meetings. At any time prior to the twelfth such consecutive
absence, the Council, in its discretion, may increase the number of absences causing a vacancy from
twelve (12) to sixteen (16).

(As amended November 7, 1995)

SECTION 503. - LIMITATION OF TERMS OF OFFICE.
No person elected to the office of Councilmember or Mayor for two (2) consecutive terms shall again
be eligible to hold that same office until one (1) full intervening term of four (4) years has elapsed. The
offices of Mayor and Councilmember shall be considered separate offices for the purpose of applying
this provision so that service of two (2) full terms in one (1) office shall not act as a bar to service of two
(2) full terms in the other. If a person serves a partial term in excess of twenty-six (26) months, it shall
be considered a full term for the purpose of this provision. This limitation applies prospectively to
terms to which persons have been elected commencing with the 2003 general municipal election.

(As amended November 4, 2003)

ARTICLE VI. - THE MAYOR
SECTION 600. - TERM OF OFFICE.
The Mayor shall hold office for a term of four (4) years from and after the first Tuesday following the
Mayor's election and until the Mayor's successor is qualified and elected.

(As amended November 7, 1989)

SECTION 601. - POWERS AND DUTIES OF MAYOR.
The Mayor shall have the following powers and duties:

(a) The Mayor shall be recognized as the official head of the City for all political, representative
and ceremonial purposes and by the Governor for military purposes;
(b) The Mayor may review with the City Manager, City Attorney and City Clerk prior to each Council meeting the items on the Council's agenda and to add matters thereto;

(c) The Mayor may make recommendations to the City Manager on matters of policy and programs;

(d) The Mayor may direct the Charter Officers to prepare and provide information to the Council on matters of policy and programs which require Council decision;

(e) The Mayor may request budgetary and any other information from the Charter Officers that the Mayor determines is necessary for the conduct of the Mayor's duties;

(f) The Mayor, together with the Council, annually shall conduct a written performance evaluation of each Charter Officer which shall include, without limitation, an evaluation of the Charter Officer's performance in implementing the Council's Statement of Policy for that Charter Officer developed pursuant to Section 725 of this Charter.

(g) The Mayor may appoint, with the advice and consent of the Council, a Chairman, a Vice-Chairman, one regular member and one alternate member to each standing, special and ad hoc committee of the Council;

(h) The Mayor may appoint, with the advice and consent of the Council, such advisory boards, commissions and ad hoc committees as may be necessary or desirable to advise and assist in the work of the Council;

(i) The Mayor may appoint such other advisory boards and ad hoc committees as may be necessary or desirable to advise and assist in the work of the Mayor; provided, however, that the members of such advisory boards or ad hoc committees shall not receive any compensation;

(j) The Mayor may recommend adjustments to the City budget and to propose the modification or curtailment of any city service. If the Mayor recommends any increases in the City budget, the Mayor shall recommend the method of financing such expenditures. If the Mayor proposes the modification or curtailment of any city service, the Mayor shall provide specific recommendations and the reasons for such proposal;

(k) The Mayor shall prepare and deliver the Mayor's Proposed Budget Priorities and Direction and the Mayor's Budget Message pursuant to Section 1302A of the Charter and the Mayor's Final Budget Modifications pursuant to Section 1303 of the Charter;

(l) The Mayor may select and hire staff to the office of Mayor and the City Council as may be necessary or desirable to advise and assist in the work of the Mayor and City Council; provided, however, that the Mayor shall not appoint to any position any business associate or any person related to him or her or to the City Manager or to any member of the Council by blood or marriage within the second degree. If staff is provided to the Council under this section, such staff shall be provided on an equal basis to each member of the Council. All such appointees shall serve at the pleasure of the Mayor in the Unclassified Service; and shall serve under such terms and conditions, salaries and benefits as are similar to other employees in Modesto's service. In the event an employee of the City who holds a Classified Service position is appointed to a position in the
Unclassified Service under this Section, he or she may return to a position in the Classified Service. Such return to the Classified Service shall be without loss of any rights or privileges that currently pertain to the Classified Service;

(m) When a vacancy occurs, the Mayor shall nominate at least two (2) candidates for Council consideration for appointment to the position of City Manager. The Mayor may express to the Council a preference among final candidates;

(n) After consultation with the Council, the Mayor may comment in writing upon the independent, written performance evaluation conducted annually by the City Manager of each head of a city department which is under the administration of the City Manager;

(o) The Mayor may attend and participate in executive meetings of the City Manager and heads of City departments which are under the administration of the City Manager;

(p) In time of public danger or emergency, the Mayor may, with the consent of the Council, or pending a meeting of the Council, direct the administration of the City Government through the City Manager;

(q) The Mayor shall be charged with the duty of making recommendations to the Council on all major matters of policy and program which require Council decision. The Mayor shall have the primary, but not exclusive, responsibility for interpreting the policies, programs and needs of the City government to the community;

(r) The Mayor may also, on the Mayor’s own account, as may each individual Council member, inform the community on any matters of policy or program which the Mayor believes the welfare of the community makes necessary;

(s) It shall be the duty of the Mayor to represent the Council in its relationships with civic groups within the City, and by direction of the Council, the Mayor shall represent the City in its relationships with other governmental agencies on matters of policy and program.

(t) The Mayor shall preside at meetings of the Council and shall have a vote as a member of the Council. The Mayor shall have no power to veto any ordinance or resolution adopted by the Council;

(u) The Mayor shall have authority to preserve order at all Council meetings and to remove or cause the removal of any person from any meeting of the Council for disorderly conduct, to enforce the rules of the Council, and to determine the order of business under the rules of the Council;

(v) The Mayor shall exercise such other powers and perform such other duties as may be consistent with the Mayor’s office or as may be granted to the Mayor by the Council not inconsistent with this Charter.

Nothing in this section shall be construed in any way as an infringement or limitation on the powers and duties of the City Manager as chief administrative officer and head of the administrative branch of the City government as prescribed in other sections of this Charter.


SECTION 602. - ADDITIONAL DUTIES.
The Mayor shall exercise such other powers and perform such other duties as may be prescribed by law or ordinance or by resolution of the Council, except as limited by this Charter.

SECTION 603. - VICE MAYOR.
At the first Council meeting in January of each year, or sooner if required, the City Council shall elect one of its members, other than the Mayor, to serve as Vice Mayor during the ensuing calendar year. The member of the council so elected shall serve as Vice Mayor until a successor is elected as provided above.

The Vice Mayor shall act as Mayor during the absence or inability of the Mayor to act. In the case of the temporary absence or disability of both the Mayor and the Vice Mayor, the Council shall designate one of its members to act as Mayor Pro Tempore.

(As amended November 4, 1980, and November 2, 1999)

ARTICLE VII. - THE COUNCIL
SECTION 700. - COUNCILMEMBERS. TERM OF OFFICE.
Except as otherwise provided in this Charter, the members of the Council shall hold office for a term of four (4) years from and after the first Tuesday following their election. The members of the Council in office at the time this Charter takes effect shall continue in office until the expiration of their terms or until their successors are elected and qualified.

If a tie vote makes it impossible to determine which of two (2) or more candidates has been elected, said tie shall be settled by the drawing of lots, the procedure for which shall be determined by the Council. Each member of the Council shall have the right to vote on all matters coming before the Council.

No candidate shall file for more than one (1) elective office; and no incumbent member of the Council shall run for a seat other than that which the member holds, except that any incumbent member of the Council may run for the seat of Mayor, and an incumbent Mayor may run for the seat of Mayor or for any other seat on the Council, all subject to the limitations of terms of office in Section 503 of this Charter.


SECTION 701. - ELIGIBILITY.
No person shall be eligible to be nominated for or to hold office as a member of the Council or as Mayor unless the person is and shall have been for at least thirty (30) days preceding the person's nomination or appointment a resident and registered elector of the City of Modesto or of territory annexed thereto.

(As amended November 4, 1980, and November 7, 1989)

SECTION 702. - VACANCIES.
If a vacancy shall occur in the office of Mayor or Councilmember, the Council shall forthwith appoint a person to fill such vacancy. Said appointee shall possess such qualifications for eligibility as are set forth in Section 701 of this article and shall hold office until a successor is duly elected and qualified. Such successor shall be chosen at the next regular municipal election, or as otherwise may be required by recall proceedings instituted involving the office of Mayor or a Councilmember.

In the event that the Council shall fail to fill a vacancy by appointment within thirty (30) days after such
exists to serve for the remainder of the unexpired term.

If a member of the City Council absents himself or herself from all regular meetings of the City Council for a period of sixty days consecutively from and after the last regular City Council meeting attended by such member, unless by permission of the City Council expressed in its official minutes, or is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, or ceases to be a qualified elector of his or her district, his or her office shall become vacant and shall be so declared by the City Council.

In the event the City Council shall fail to fill a vacancy by appointment within thirty days after such office shall have been so declared vacant, it shall forthwith cause an election to be held to fill such vacancy from the proper district. (As amended effective December 20, 2010)

Section 404. The Mayor. Mayor Pro Tempore.

On the date of any meeting of the City Council at which time the Council receives the certification of the results of any general or special municipal election at which any member of Council is elected, the City Council shall, after swearing and qualifying any newly elected member, elect one of its members as its presiding officer, who shall have the title of Mayor. The Mayor shall have a voice and vote in all its proceedings. The Mayor shall have the primary but not exclusive responsibility for interpreting the policies, programs and needs of the City government to the people, and, as occasion requires, the Mayor may inform the people of any change in policy or program. The Mayor shall perform such other duties consistent with the office as may be prescribed by this Charter or as may be imposed by the City Council. The Mayor shall serve in such capacity at the pleasure of the City Council.

The City Council shall at the same time the Mayor is elected also designate one of its members as Mayor Pro Tempore, who shall serve in such capacity at the pleasure of the City Council. The Mayor Pro Tempore shall perform the duties of the Mayor during the Mayor's absence or disability. (As amended effective April 28, 1966, June 6, 1974, April 8, 1980, November 6, 1984, and January 9, 2013)

Section 405. Powers Vested in the City Council.

All powers of the City shall be vested in the City Council except as otherwise provided in this Charter.

Section 406. Interference in Administrative Service.

Neither the City Council nor any of its members shall interfere with the execution by the City Manager of his or her powers and duties, or order, directly or indirectly, the appointment by the City Manager or by any of the department heads in the administrative service of the City, of any person to an office or employment or his or her removal therefrom. Except for the purpose of inquiry, the City Council and its members shall deal with the administrative service under the City Manager solely through the City Manager and neither the City Council nor any member thereof shall give orders to any subordinates of the City Manager, either publicly or privately. (As amended effective December 20, 2010)

Section 407. Regular Meetings.

The City Council shall hold two meetings per month except in the months of August and December when there shall be at least one regular meeting in August and one regular meeting in December. The City Council shall hold regular meetings at such times as it shall fix by ordinance or resolution. All regular meetings shall be publicly noticed according to the Ralph M. Brown Act, or any successor law. (As amended effective January 9, 2013)

Section 408. Special Meetings.

Special meetings may be called at any time by the Mayor, or by four members of the City Council, by written notice sent to each member and publicly noticed according to the Ralph M. Brown Act, or any successor law. (As amended effective June 6, 1974, and January 9, 2013)

Section 409. Place of Meetings.

All regular meetings shall be held in the Council Chambers of the City Hall, however other types of meetings shall be at locations allowed by the Ralph M. Brown Act, or any successor law. If, by reason of fire, flood or other emergency, it shall be unsafe to
The City Council may take no action on the recommendation, or it may, by ordinance, adjust the compensation paid to members of the City Council by an amount not to exceed the recommendations of the Committee. No action which increases the compensation of City Council in excess of the level recommended by the Committee may be taken without a vote of the people. Any ordinance adopted pursuant to a recommendation of the Committee shall be adopted by a 2/3 majority vote and shall be subject to referendum as provided in this Charter. Once compensation has been initially established as provided in this section, no increase in the annual compensation shall be greater than five percent for each calendar year following the operative date of the most recent change for the compensation. No more than one ordinance establishing the compensation of City Council members may be adopted in any two calendar year period. Any compensation and benefits fixed as a result of this Section shall constitute full compensation for the services of the City Council member and the maximum benefits provided to the City Council member by the City.

Until such time as the City Council adopts an ordinance as provided herein, Councilmembers shall continue to receive the compensation in effect as of the effective date of the Section.

(Sec. 405 amended by vote of the people 11-3-1998: Sec. 405 amended by vote of the people 3-9-1993: Sec. 405 amended by vote of the people 11-4-1980, effective May 4, 1981.)

Section 406. - THE MAYOR.

The Mayor shall be nominated and elected by the voters of the City at large for a term of four years beginning with the municipal elections to be conducted in 1999. The Mayor shall be a voting member of the City Council and shall preside at meetings of the City Council. The Mayor shall act as chief executive of the City in performing all acts required to be performed under the laws of the State of California and this Charter. The Mayor shall be recognized as the official head of the City for all ceremonial purposes, by the Courts for the purpose of serving civil process and by the Governor of the State for military purposes. The Mayor shall have a voice and vote in all proceedings of the City Council and shall perform such other duties as may be prescribed by this Charter or as may be imposed by the City Council consistent with his or her office.

(Sec. 406 amended by vote of the people 11-3-1998: Sec. 406 amended by vote of the people 3-9-1993.)

Section 407. - THE VICE MAYOR.

At its organizational meeting, the City Council shall elect from among the Councilmembers a Vice Mayor who shall exercise the powers and perform the duties of the Mayor during the latter’s absence or disability.

(Sec. 407 amended by vote of the people 11-3-1998: Sec. 407 amended by vote of the people 3-9-1993.)

Section 408. - POWERS VESTED IN THE CITY COUNCIL.

All powers of the City shall be vested in the City Council subject to the provisions of this Charter and to the Constitution of the State of California. The City Council is empowered to carry into effect the provisions of this Charter, to execute the powers vested in the City, and to perform all duties and obligations imposed upon the City by State law.

(Sec. 408 amended by vote of the people 3-9-1993.)

Section 409. - OFFICERS APPOINTED BY CITY COUNCIL.

The City Council shall appoint and may remove the City Manager, City Attorney, City Prosecutor,
A vacancy on the City Council, or in the Office of Mayor, from whatever cause arising other than expiration of term or the election of a member of the City Council to the Office of Mayor, shall be filled by appointment by the City Council within thirty (30) days of the occurrence of such vacancy unless it occurs less than one hundred (100) days before a general municipal election, in which case the office shall remain vacant until the election. If the event there is no unelected City Council candidate at the election at which a member of the City Council is elected Mayor, the City Council vacancy shall be filled as provided in this paragraph. The person appointed shall serve until the next general municipal election at which time any unexpired term shall be filled by election. In the event that a vacancy occurs after the final date for publishing the notice of election for a general municipal election and the term of office does not expire until the next succeeding general municipal election, the vacancy shall be filled by appointment by the City Council, within thirty (30) days after the election, of the unelected candidate who received the highest number of votes for election to the City Council at said election.

If the Mayor or other member of the City Council absents himself from all regular meetings of the City Council for a period of sixty (60) days consecutively from and after the last regular Council meeting attended by him, unless by permission of the City Council expressed in its official minutes, or if convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, or ceases to be an elector of the City, his office shall become vacant. The City Council shall declare the existence of any such vacancy. (Approved by election held November 2, 1982.)

Section 504. The Mayor.

The Mayor shall be the presiding officer at all meetings of the City Council and shall be included as a member of the City Council for all purposes under this Charter unless otherwise expressly provided. He shall be counted in determining a quorum and shall be entitled to vote on all matters, but shall possess no veto power. The Mayor may make and second motions and shall have a voice and vote in all its proceedings. He shall be the official head of the City for all ceremonial purposes. He shall have the primary but not the exclusive responsibility for interpreting the policies, programs and needs of the City government to the people, and as occasion requires, he may inform the people of any change in policy or program. He shall perform such other duties consistent with his office as may be prescribed by this Charter or as may be imposed by the City Council.

The City Council shall designate one (1) of its members as Mayor Pro Tempore, who shall serve in such capacity at the pleasure of the City Council. The Mayor Pro Tempore shall perform the duties of the Mayor during the absence or disability of the Mayor.

Section 505. Powers Vested in City Council.

All powers of the City shall be vested in the City Council except as otherwise provided in this Charter.

Section 506. Regular Meetings.

The City Council shall hold regular meetings at least once each week at such times as it shall fix by ordinance or resolution and may adjourn or re-adjourn any regular meeting to a date and hour certain which shall be specified in the order of adjournment and when so adjourned each adjourned meeting shall be a regular meeting for all purposes. If the hour to which a meeting is adjourned is not stated in the order of adjournment, such meeting shall be held at the hour for holding regular meetings. If at any time any regular meeting falls on a holiday such regular meeting shall be held on the next business day.

Section 507. Special Meetings.

A special meeting may be called at any time by the Mayor, or by a majority of the members of the City Council, by written notice to each member of the City Council and to each local newspaper of general circulation, radio or television station requesting notice in writing. Such notice must be delivered personally or by mail and must be received at least twenty-four (24) hours before the time of such meeting as specified in the notice. The call and notice shall specify the time and place of the special meeting and the business to be transacted. No other business shall be considered at such meeting. Such written notice may be dispensed with as to any person entitled thereto who, at or prior to the time the meeting convenes, files with the City Clerk a written waiver of notice. Such waiver may be given by telegram. Such written notice may also be dispensed with as to any person who is actually present at the meeting at the time it convenes. (Approved by election held November 2, 1982.)
Sec. 704

Presiding officer – Mayor.

The Mayor shall be the presiding officer. The Mayor shall have a voice and vote in all its proceedings. He/she shall be the official head of the City for all ceremonial purposes. He/she shall perform such other duties as may be prescribed by this Charter or as may be imposed by the City Council consistent with his/her office. (As amended by the electors at election held November 5, 1968, approved by Joint Resolution of the Legislature filed with the Secretary of State January 15, 1969; Amended by electors at an election held March 7, 2000, Charter Chapter 11 of the State Statutes of 2000)

Sec. 704.1 Mayor – Limitation of terms.

No person who has been elected to the office of Mayor for two successive four-year terms shall be eligible to run for election to the office of Mayor, nor to serve as such, for any additional successive term; but the above shall not disqualify any person from running for election to the office of Mayor, nor from further service as Mayor, for any term or terms which are not successive, nor for any parts of terms which are not successive. (Added by electors at election held November 5, 1968, approved by Joint Resolution of Legislature filed with the Secretary of State January 15, 1969)

Sec. 704.2 Mayor – Political position.

The Mayor shall be the political leader within the community by providing guidance and leadership to the City Council, by expressing and explaining to the community the City's policies and programs and by assisting the City Council in the informed, vigorous and effective exercise of its powers. Political leadership shall be concerned with the general development of the community and the general level of City services and activity programs. (Added by electors at election held November 5, 1968, approved by Joint Resolution of Legislature filed with the Secretary of State January 15, 1969)

Sec. 704.3 Mayor – Powers and duties.

The Mayor shall have the following powers and duties:

(a) The Mayor shall have the power to make recommendations to the City Council on matters of policy and programs which require City Council decision; provided, that if he/she recommends any increases in the City budget, he/she shall recommend the method of financing such expenditure; and provided, further, that if he/she proposes curtailment of service, such recommendations and his/her reason therefor shall be specific. He/she may also, on his/her own account, inform the community on matters of policy or program which he/she believes the welfare of the community make necessary.

(b) The Mayor shall preside at meetings of the City Council and shall have the vote as a member of the City Council. He/she shall have no veto power.

(c) The Mayor shall have authority to preserve order at all City Council meetings, to remove or cause the removal of any person from any meeting of the City Council for disorderly conduct, to enforce the rules of the City Council and to determine the order of business under the rules of the City Council.

(d) The Mayor shall exercise such other powers and perform such other duties as may be prescribed by the City Council, provided that the same are not inconsistent with this Charter. Nothing in this section shall be construed in any way as an infringement or limitation on the powers and duties of the City Manager as Chief Administrative Officer and head of the administrative branch of the City government as prescribed in other sections of this Charter. Except as otherwise herein provided, the Mayor shall possess only such authority over the City Manager and the administrative branch as he/she possesses as one member of the City Council.
Sec. 704.4 Mayor – Vacancy.

The office of Mayor shall become and be deemed vacant immediately upon the incumbent ceasing to be a member of the City Council. (Added by electors at election held November 5, 1968, approved by Joint Resolution of Legislature filed with the Secretary of State January 15, 1969)

Sec. 705 Vice Mayor.

The City Council shall designate one of its members as Vice Mayor. The Vice Mayor shall perform the duties of the Mayor during his/her absence or disability. The Vice Mayor shall serve in such capacity at the pleasure of the City Council. (As amended by electors at election held November 5, 1968, approved by Joint Resolution of Legislature filed with the Secretary of State, January 15, 1969; Amended by electors at an election held March 7, 2000, Charter Chapter 11 of the State Statutes of 2000)

Sec. 706 Powers.

All powers of the City shall be vested in the City Council, subject to the provisions of the Charter and to the Constitution of the State of California.

Sec. 707 Regular meetings.

The City Council shall hold regular meetings at least twice each month, at such times as it shall fix by ordinance or resolution and may adjourn or readjourn any regular meeting to a date certain, which shall be specified in the order of adjournment and when so adjourned, each adjourned meeting shall be a regular meeting for all purposes.

Sec. 708 Special meetings.

Special meetings may be called at any time by the Mayor, or by four members of the City Council pursuant to the provisions of the Ralph M. Brown Act, specifically Government Code Section 54956, as amended from time to time. (Amended by electors at an election held March 7, 2000, Charter Chapter 11 of the State Statutes of 2000)

Sec. 709 Place of meeting.

All meetings of the City Council shall be held at the locations authorized by the Ralph M. Brown Act (commencing with Government Code Section 54950) as it now reads or is hereafter amended. (Amended by electors at an election held March 7, 2000, Charter Chapter 11 of the State Statutes of 2000)

Sec. 710 Quorum.

A majority of the members of the City Council shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business, but a less number may adjourn from time to time.

Sec. 711 Election and qualification of Council members.

The City Council shall judge the qualifications of its members as required by the Charter and shall judge all election returns.
604. Presiding officer. Mayor.

(a) On the first Tuesday following any general or special municipal election at which City Council members are elected, the City Council shall meet and shall elect one of its members as its presiding officer, who shall have the title of Mayor. The Mayor shall have a voice and vote in all its proceedings. The Mayor shall be the official head of the City for all ceremonial purposes. The Mayor shall perform such other duties as may be prescribed by this Charter or as may be imposed by the City Council consistent with the Mayor's office. The Mayor shall serve in such capacity at the pleasure of the City Council.

(b) Mayor Pro Tempore. The City Council shall also designate one of its members as Mayor Pro Tempore. The Mayor Pro Tempore shall perform the duties of the Mayor during the Mayor's absence or disability.

(Amended at General Municipal Election, November 3, 1992; certified by Res. No. 8503CCS)
ordinance or appointing or dismissing or confirming the appointment or dismissal of any officer, or authorizing the execution of contracts, or the appropriation or payment of money.

(4) Choose one of its members as presiding officer, to be called Mayor. The Mayor shall preside over the sessions of the Council, shall sign official documents when the signature of the Council or Mayor is required by law, and he shall act as the official head of the City on public and ceremonial occasions. He shall have power to administer oaths and affirmations. When the Mayor is absent from any meeting of the Council, the members of the Council may choose another member to act as Vice Mayor, and he shall for the time being, have the powers of the Mayor.

(5) Appoint a City Attorney, a City Manager, a City Clerk, and five Library Trustees.

Section 6. Ordinance: The enacting clause of every ordinance passed by the Council shall be: "Be it ordained by the Council of the City of Visalia." The enacting clause of every ordinance initiated by the people shall be: "Be it ordained by the people of the City of Visalia." At least five days must elapse between the introduction and the final passage of any ordinance; provided, that amendments germane to the subject of any proposed ordinance may be made when it is brought up for final passage; and provided further, that in case of an extraordinary epidemic or any disaster, such as flood, fire, or earthquake requiring immediate action on the part of any public authority, an emergency ordinance may be introduced and passed at either a regular or special meeting without any intervention of time between introduction and final passage. A final vote on any ordinance or any vote on any appropriation must be taken only at a regular or adjourned regular meeting. Every ordinance must be signed by the Mayor, attested by the Clerk and the ordinance or a brief summary thereof published once in the official newspaper. Any ordinance granting any franchise or privilege shall be published at the expense of the applicant therefor.

Section 7. When Ordinances go into Effect: Except as otherwise provided in this Charter every ordinance, and every measure passed by the Council granting any franchise or privilege, shall go into effect at the expiration of thirty days after its final passage, unless otherwise provided in said ordinance or measure; provided, however, that no such ordinance or measure shall go into effect less than thirty days from its final passage. But ordinances declared by the Council to be necessary as emergency measures for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, or safety, containing a statement of the reasons for their urgency and passed by a four-fifths vote of the Council, ordinances ordering or otherwise relating to annexations, elections, and ordinances relating to public improvements, the cost of which is to be borne wholly or in part by special assessments, may go into effect at the will of the Council.

Section 8. Amending Ordinances: No ordinance shall be amended by reference to its title, but the sections thereof to be amended, shall be re-enacted at length as amended; and any amendment passed contrary to the provisions of this section shall be void, except the City Council may adopt and amend any standard code of technical regulations by reference thereto without the necessity of publishing said ordinances in their entirety; providing, however, that three (3) copies of the specific codes to be adopted by reference are available for inspection in the City Clerk's office between the introduction and passage of said ordinance.

Section 9. Codification of Ordinances: Any or all ordinances of the City which have been enacted and published in the manner required at the time of their adoption, and which have not been repealed, may be compiled, consolidated, revised, indexed and arranged as a comprehensive ordinance code, and such code may be adopted by reference with the same effect as an ordinance by the passage of an ordinance for such purpose. Such code need not be published in the manner required for other ordinances, but not less than three (3) copies thereof shall be filed for use and examination by the public in the office of the City Clerk prior to the adoption thereof. Ordinances codified shall be repealed as of the effective date of the code.
California Cities with Populations Between 100,000 and 150,000
Method to Select Mayor

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<tr>
<td>City of Costa Mesa</td>
<td>Charter</td>
<td>Mayor is Appointed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of Daly City</td>
<td>General Law</td>
<td>Mayor is Appointed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of Downey</td>
<td>Charter</td>
<td>Mayor is Appointed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of El Cajon</td>
<td>Charter</td>
<td>Mayor is directly elected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of El Monte</td>
<td>General Law</td>
<td>Mayor is directly elected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of Escondido</td>
<td>General Law</td>
<td>Mayor is directly elected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of Fairfield</td>
<td>General Law</td>
<td>Mayor is directly elected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of Fullerton</td>
<td>General Law</td>
<td>Mayor is Appointed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of Hayward</td>
<td>Charter</td>
<td>Mayor is directly elected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of Inglewood</td>
<td>General Law</td>
<td>Mayor is directly elected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of Murrieta</td>
<td>General Law</td>
<td>Mayor is Appointed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of Norwalk</td>
<td>General Law</td>
<td>Mayor is Appointed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of Orange</td>
<td>General Law</td>
<td>Mayor is directly elected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of Pasadena</td>
<td>Charter</td>
<td>Mayor is directly elected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of Rialto</td>
<td>General Law</td>
<td>Mayor is directly elected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of Richmond</td>
<td>Charter</td>
<td>Mayor is directly elected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAME OF CITY</td>
<td>GENERAL LAW OR CHARTER</td>
<td>IS MAYOR DIRECTLY ELECTED OR APPOINTED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of Roseville</td>
<td>Charter</td>
<td>Mayor is directly Elected(^1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of San Mateo</td>
<td>Charter</td>
<td>Mayor is Appointed (changes every year)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of Santa Clara</td>
<td>Charter</td>
<td>Mayor is directly Elected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of Santa Maria</td>
<td>Charter</td>
<td>Mayor is directly Elected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of Simi Valley</td>
<td>General Law</td>
<td>Mayor is directly Elected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of Sunnyvale</td>
<td>Charter</td>
<td>Mayor is Appointed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of Temecula</td>
<td>General Law</td>
<td>Mayor is Appointed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of Thousand Oaks</td>
<td>General Law</td>
<td>Mayor is Appointed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of Torrance</td>
<td>Charter</td>
<td>Mayor is directly Elected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of Vallejo</td>
<td>Charter</td>
<td>Mayor is directly Elected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of Victorville</td>
<td>Charter</td>
<td>Mayor is Appointed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of Visalia</td>
<td>Charter</td>
<td>Mayor is Appointed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of West Covina</td>
<td>General Law</td>
<td>Mayor is Appointed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\) By highest votes, then serves two years as Vice Mayor. Following two years as Mayor.
Mayoral Leadership in Council-Manager Cities: Preconditions versus Preconceptions

James H. Svara
University of North Carolina at Greensboro

The nature and types of leadership provided by mayors in council-manager cities have not been adequately developed in previous studies. A major shortcoming has been the tendency to measure the office and performance in terms of the executive mayor whose leadership, according to the innovator model, stresses policy innovation and implementation. Neither of these dimensions of leadership is appropriate to non-executive mayors who work with equals on the council and an appointed manager. This form, however, offers opportunities for leadership in two areas: improving the coordination among the participants in the governmental process and guiding the development of policy. The study generates a comprehensive list of mayoral roles based on content analysis of open-ended interviews with leaders in the five large cities in North Carolina. These roles are used to form a typology of leadership. When the types of leadership provided by mayors in council-manager cities are redefined, the preconditions for effective leadership are reexamined.

The mayoralty in the council-manager form of government may be the most misunderstood leadership position in American local government. Dismissed as a figurehead or confused with mayors in cities where the position is a true executive office, nonexecutive mayors are commonly perceived to be doing less than they are or capable of doing more than they can. Often overlooked by citizens and scholars alike is the potential for the council-manager mayor to provide unique types of leadership, different from the executive mayor but appropriate to the form of government in which the office is located. The mayor’s conduct in office can strongly influence how well a council-manager government performs.

A shortcoming in much of the limited literature on council-manager mayors is a tendency to measure the office and performance in terms of the executive mayor. Although an occasional council-manager mayor might be considered to be an effective leader by this standard, it is unfair and inappropriate to set up the executive mayor as the norm. This and other preconceptions stand in the way of identifying the dimensions of the office and the leadership roles that the mayor may fill, some common to any city government, but most distinct to a form in which the mayor is chairman of the governing board rather than chief executive officer.

EXHIBIT "4"
Depending on how these roles are filled, mayors display different profiles of leadership. The literature suggests that only by achieving de facto chief executive status does an incumbent become a "real" mayor, yet rarely will the preconditions be favorable for such leadership. This study offers an alternative view of the nature of the mayor's office and identifies a type of leadership which in comprehensive and consistent with the basic features of council-manager government. The preconditions for this kind of leadership are reasonable and readily, if not easily, attainable.

This study is based on interviews with mayors, council members, managers and department heads, and community leaders in the five large cities in North Carolina between 1982 and 1983. In one of those cities, Greensboro, the author has studied a succession of five mayors who served since 1965. As in almost all studies of council-manager mayors, the data to be analyzed have been collected only in cities with this form. When comparisons are made, they are to the executive mayor as developed in the literature. Such an approach is warranted until there is a clear conceptualization of the office in council-manager cities which can guide true comparative research. In this paper, a model of mayoral leadership is derived inductively from content analysis of responses to questions concerning what mayors do, as perceived by themselves, those with whom the mayor works, and observers of city government.


PREVIOUS STUDIES

The office under investigation is part of a larger package of institutional arrangements which have been promoted by the reform movement through the National Municipal League. Central to the proposed changes in city government structure was unifying and strengthening the executive, either through a stronger mayor in its initial formulation of a "model charter" for cities, or since 1915 by means of the council-manager form of government (National Municipal League, 1964). The chief executive officer in this form is the appointed manager. The mayor is a member of the council and typically has no formal powers other than to preside over the council and be recognized as ceremonial head of the city.

1 The cities included in the study are Charlotte, Durham, Greensboro, Raleigh, and Winston-Salem, all cities over 100,000 in population. Open-ended interviews were conducted with the mayor; three or four council members; the manager, assistant manager for operations, and heads of the department of planning and budget; leaders of the Chamber of Commerce, League of Women's Voters, and NAACP; and the city hall reporter from the newspaper. Respondents were promised anonymity. Since there are several cases of unanimous response within a particular city, it is not possible to identify the cities by name without violating the promise of anonymity.

2 Among the studies to be reviewed in this article, only Kotter and Lawrence (1974) analyze data from mayor-council and council-manager cities. Abney and Lauth (1982b), in their study of executive influence over line agencies, treat the mayor-council mayor and the city manager as comparable executive officers.
Reflecting the limited scope of the office and the primacy of undiluted executive leadership in the reform scheme, Kammerer (1964) and Booth (1968) assessed the impact of direct election of the mayor on the manager's authority, the former arguing that the practice threatens the manager and the latter concluding that it makes no difference.

Since 1970, four major studies of council-manager mayors have gone beyond formal charter provisions to define the dimensions of the office and the sources on which leadership is based. Two of these examine the office from the strong executive perspective (Pressman, 1972; Sparrow, 1984), and two reflect the norms of council-manager cities in analyzing mayoral performance (Boynton and Wright, 1970; Wikstrom, 1979). A fifth includes council-manager cities in a general study of mayoral leadership (Kotter and Lawrence, 1974).

In the first category are two valuable case studies of individual mayors. Pressman's study of a reluctant mayor in one city—Mayor Redding of Oakland—has strongly colored perceptions of the office. When leadership is displayed, it will be largely "hortatory in nature," given the characteristics of the form (p. 523). Sparrow demonstrates that broader leadership is possible if the system is transformed. He charts the creation of a "new municipal chief executive model" (p. 5) by Mayor Pete Wilson of San Diego.

Beyond providing interesting details of the trials and triumphs of two mayors, however, both studies suffer from preconceptions about the nature of the office and the form of government which may not be warranted. First, they accept the innovator model—drawn from mayor-council cities (Dahl, 1961; George, 1968; Cunningham, 1970)—as the norm for mayoral leadership and, therefore, assume that the "normal" council-manager form does not provide the opportunity for mayoral leadership. The effective mayor, as entrepreneur, sets goals, builds coalitions, and influences the council, bureaucracy, and public to act according to the mayor's preferences. In most cities, mayors have to augment their limited formal assets to acquire leverage over other participants or to induce support. This is particularly true, they argue, in council-manager government. "Without governmental jurisdiction, staff, and financial resources," Pressman writes (p. 522), "it is hard for any mayor to direct, or even influence, the actions of others." Influence is based on personal resources "in spite of structure" (p. 521). Sparrow as well stresses the need for the "informal incremental pyramiding of power" (p. 4). Wilson's leadership was based on "adroit accumulation of political, policymaking, and administrative power" culminating in de facto control over the selection of the manager (pp. 5-6). Only by tapping resources outside the formal structure or altering the form, it appears, is leadership possible. The studies give no attention, however, to the possibility that the formal
authority normally available to elected officials in council-manager government will provide the basis for influence.

Second, the approach in both studies is mayor-centered and distrustful of professional administrators. If the mayor does not activate the lethargic city government or give it direction, no other elected official will. The manager, they suggest, will manipulate the council, pursue a personal/professional agenda, and take cues from outside influentials, but will not provide leadership responsive to elected officials or supportive of their exercise of democratic control. The manager, Pressman observed, “may be responsive to citizen’s preferences because he deems it to be a wise policy to act in such a manner” (p. 523), but his superior resources gave the manager “domination” of the governmental process (p. 515). Sparrow suggests that managers generally seek to promote the growth of the city because in the process their “personal worth” increases through “larger and more professional staffs, an increasing tax base, and greater influence” (p. 4). The manager was responsive to the council in San Diego only so long as it supported growth, and staff resisted a change in policy. Only when Wilson secured the appointment of a manager who was willing to settle for a scope of responsibilities limited by the mayor’s activities was political control achieved. An implication of this approach is that leadership cannot be collective, either exercised by the mayor and manager or the council as a whole.

Finally, and underlying the other preconceptions, is the presumption of conflict within the governmental process. Sparrow viewed power in San Diego as a hydraulic system “whereby decrease in the manager’s power would result in increased mayoral power,” (p. 6) and Pressman’s analysis of Oakland also rests on a zero-sum conception of power.

These conditions can not be assumed to be invariant in the urban governmental process. Although presumably appropriate to the cities studied, they are not supported by the other studies of council-manager governments nor do they square with the characteristics in the North Carolina cities under investigation.

The other major studies do not fall into the same conceptual traps. Boynton and Wright and Wikstrom demonstrate that the form of government does not preclude leadership. Boynton and Wright (1971) investigated patterns of partnership between the mayor and manager. The preponderance of “collaborative or team relationships” (p. 33) in 45 large cities indicates that cooperative relationships between elected and appointed officials are common, and clearly contradicts an assumption of inherent conflict in relations among officials. They identified three significant spheres of activity in city government—legislative, public, and bureaucratic. The mayor’s significance derives from the dominant role he
typically plays in the first two and the unusually close relationship he has to the third because of his extensive interaction with the manager.

Wikstrom (1979, p. 273), in a study of 41 cities in Virginia, identifies five leadership roles, all of which draw upon essential features of the form if the individual uses the opportunities inherent in the office to the fullest. These are (1) presiding over the council and representing the city, (2) facilitating constructive interaction between the council and manager, (3) providing leadership to the council, (4) providing political leadership, and (5) realizing goals. Almost all mayors in Virginia at least provide council leadership, and 38% also provide political leadership. They do not operate alone, however. Wikstrom concludes, reminiscent of Boyton and Wright, that council-manager government has evolved into “teamwork governance; mayors and managers need and depend upon each other” (p. 275).

There are minor shortcomings in this study. Wikstrom does not define the leadership roles with sufficient clarity. He treats the policy role as the ultimate form of leadership, rather than considering the possibility that this aspect of leadership may be inextricably bound to the other leadership roles. Considering the mayor as a multifaceted leader would have been more appropriate in view of his findings. Furthermore, he suggests that when the mayor’s policy role expands and he becomes more broadly involved in administrative matters, the council-manager form resembles a “skew version of the mayor-council with a CAO [chief administrative officer] form” (p. 275).

This observation implies that effective mayoral leadership alters the form of government. With similar reasoning, George (1984) identifies a trend toward the emergence of a “strong-mayor, council-manager” form of government, and Sparrow concludes (1984, p. 8) that “the city manager is losing power.” It has not been demonstrated, however, that extensive mayoral leadership necessarily shifts the basic character of the form of government, or that the mayor must transform the system in order to acquire leadership. Furthermore, the conclusion ignores the considerable shifts in roles and attitudes among all officials: not only are mayors more policy conscious, in addition council members are more activist and oriented to constituency services (Heilig and Mundt, 1984), and managers are more assertive, politically sensitive, and professionally competent. Still, the form of government appears to have retained its basic character.

3 The new orientation of managers is reflected in the most recent handbook for managers written for the International City Management Association (1983) by Wayne F. Anderson, Richard J. Stillman II, and Chester A. Newland, which provides much more sophisticated treatment of the manager’s political as well as organizational roles than previous publications in the series of Green books. The profession’s broadening range of concerns has been expressed in a new Declaration of Ideals (Public Management, August, 1984) for the city management profession to accompany its long-standing Code of Ethics.
The final study allows for a mayor to have impact based on the range of his interactions and the quality of his ideas and places less emphasis on his power over other officials. In 20 cities, including seven with council-manager form, Kotter and Lawrence (1974) analyze mayoral behavior in three processes: agenda setting, network building, and task accomplishing. They argue that the “scope of the mayor’s domain”—those areas in which the mayor “behaves as if he has some responsibility”—is determined more by the nature of the mayor’s agenda-setting activities than by the assignment of formal responsibility (p. 61). Also, mayors can establish a broad network of relationships regardless of formal powers. Task accomplishment will, however, largely be limited to an “individualistic” approach, in which the mayor works on tasks by himself, unless he has the formal control over the bureaucracy or supportive staff (typically absent from council-manager government), or unusually great entrepreneurial capacity. Thus, their framework leads to conclusions similar to those of Pressman and Sparrow: leadership is likely to be limited unless the mayor has rare personal characteristics. A conceptual approach which does not include task accomplishment would be more relevant to council-manager mayors. Furthermore, their emphasis on the need to build networks fails to recognize the inherent potential for mayors in this form to handle communication and facilitate cooperation, starting with the close relationship to the manager.

It is conceptually possible for the internal process of city government to be characterized by cooperation rather than conflict as the normal condition. Axelrod (1984) has shown that cooperation can evolve in any setting, and the cooperation possible in council-manager systems goes beyond the self-interested accommodation he describes. Interactions in the council-manager form may approximate Barnard’s (1938) concept of organizations as cooperative systems. When Mayor Henry Cisneros of San Antonio (1985) recently called upon council-manager cities to create “models of concensus” for decision making, he was not being naive according to this reasoning. He was seeking to promote the potential for cooperative relationships in this form of government.

Major sources of conflict inside government are separation of powers, which is not present as a line of cleavage in council-manager governments (Newland, 1985), and tension between those who make up the permanent membership of the administrative organization and the transient elected officials over it. Widely divergent perspectives are not likely, since councils normally pick managers who reflect their point of view about

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* Among the seven mayors studied, only one—Erik Johnson, Mayor of Dallas 1964-1971—displayed a comprehensive type of leadership based on fostering a goal-setting process for the city and active network building. Of the other six, four were “minimum” mayors and two had limited impact as “individualist/personality” type leaders (Kotter and Lawrence, 1974, ch. 7).
programs and administrative style (Flentje and Counihan, 1984). Managers, despite their influence over policy, are "responsive and accountable" to community values as conveyed by the council (Loveridge, 1971, p. 173). Friction is reduced when responsibilities are divided in a way that limits interference by one set of officials in the activities of the other. A dichotomy-duality pattern of dividing responsibilities has been observed in the North Carolina cities included in this study (Svara, 1985). Although elected officials are largely responsible for setting the mission and broad goals for city government while managers handle the management systems of the city, the officials share responsibility for the formulation of middle-range policy and its implementation. Cooperation is typically sought, if not always achieved, in many council-manager cities. In this context, the unique nature of the mayor's position comes into focus: the mayor is the single most important agent of cooperation in relations among officials.

The nature of mayoral leadership in council-manager cities has not been fully elaborated in previous research. This will not happen as long as the chief executive mayor is held up as the norm, and interactions within city governments are interpreted exclusively in terms of a conflict model of the governmental process, as certain studies have done. Other studies have begun to fill in the distinctive forms of partnership and leadership displayed by mayors in this form of government. The office needs to be redefined by examining the characteristics of the form of government and analyzing the role definitions offered by those who occupy the office and who work with or observe the mayor.

LEADERSHIP ROLES IN COUNCIL-MANAGER CITIES

The council-manager mayor is analogous to the chairman of the board, important but not crucial to the operation of the organization. The executive mayor with considerable formal power, some control over resource allocation, and extensive public recognition often becomes the driving force in a mayor-council government. The resources and contribution of the "chairman" mayor are more difficult to discern.

Long-term research in Greensboro indicates that mayors have opportunities for two kinds of leadership beyond traditional ceremonial functions. During the last twenty years—despite relative constancy in conditions and governmental structure—different mayors have realized neither, one, or both of these opportunities. One of these is a coordinative component in which the mayor pulls together the parts of council-manager government to improve their interaction. The mayor occupies a strategic location shaped by his special and close relationship with the council, manager/staff, and public. Unlike Kotter and Lawrence's approach, which stresses building and maintaining a set of relationships, the mayor's
distinctive interaction with the participants provides a network which is readily available to him if he chooses to use it. The mayor, by virtue of his favored position, is able to tap into various communication networks among elected officials, governmental staff, and community leaders. Although they can and do interact with each other independently, the mayor can transmit messages better than anyone else in the government because of the breadth of knowledge and range of contacts he is likely to have. In so doing, the mayor has a unique potential to expand the level of understanding and improve the coordination among participants in the governmental process.

The second opportunity is guidance in the initiation and execution of policy, which may be done through the coordinative dimension or separately. The mayor not only channels communication but may also influence and shape the messages being transmitted. More dramatic techniques may be employed to raise issues and put forth proposals, but the mayor runs the risk of alienating the council whose support is needed to be effective. This mayor is constrained by the formal weaknesses noted in other studies, but he has great potential to guide other officials toward the accomplishment of goals favored by the mayor.

Drawing from interviews since 1982 with and about the mayors of the five largest cities in North Carolina, it is possible to isolate eleven distinct roles that a mayor may or may not perform. Mayors, council members, and community leaders were asked, using open-ended questions, to describe the responsibilities and roles of the mayor in their city. Content analysis was used to categorize responses. It is a testament to the diffuseness of the job that there is such variation in how the job is perceived, once one goes beyond formal responsibilities. The roles and percentage of respondents who mentioned each are listed in table 1. The relative frequency of references to the roles varies greatly, since some roles separated in analysis may be viewed as blended, some roles are not observed by certain participants, and some roles are absent in certain cities. The object of research at this stage is to identify a comprehensive set of roles for the mayor's office, whether or not they are generally perceived. The eleven roles can be grouped into five dimensions of leadership, major areas in which a mayor may make contributions to the functioning of city government. Whether he engages in the roles is a separate question which provides the basis for distinguishing among types of mayor leadership, which are addressed in the next section.

5 The five mayors are all directly elected for two-year terms. They preside over the city council and vote on all matters, with the exception of Charlotte. There, the mayor has limited voting authority and has the power to veto actions of the city council.
## Table 1

**Dimensions and Roles of Mayoral Leadership**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>%</th>
<th>A. Ceremony and Presiding:</th>
<th></th>
<th>B. Communication and Facilitation</th>
<th></th>
<th>C. Organization and Guidance</th>
<th></th>
<th>D. Promotion</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>82.8%</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
<td></td>
<td>29.3%</td>
<td></td>
<td>35.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>51.7%</td>
<td></td>
<td>29.3%</td>
<td></td>
<td>29.3%</td>
<td></td>
<td>10.6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Ceremonial tasks</td>
<td></td>
<td>4. Educator: informational and educational tasks vis-a-vis council, manager, and/or public.</td>
<td></td>
<td>7. Goal setter: setting goals and objectives for council and manager, identifying problems, establishing tone for the council.</td>
<td></td>
<td>10. Promoter: promoting and defending the city, seeking investment, handling external relationships, securing agreement among parties to a project.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Spokesman for council</td>
<td></td>
<td>5. Liaison with manager: promotes informal exchange both ways between the council and the manager and staff.</td>
<td></td>
<td>8. Organizer: stabilizing relationships, guiding council to recognition of its roles and responsibilities, defining and adjusting the relationship with the manager.</td>
<td></td>
<td>11. Directing staff: Giving orders to staff, directing the manager, expediting action by staff.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n=58

Typically perceived by observers of council-manager government is the mayor's responsibility for a variety of *ceremonial tasks*, representing the city, and appearing at many and various meetings, dinners, and other special occasions. The mayor also serves as *spokesman for council*, enunciating positions taken, informing the public about upcoming business, and reacting to questions about the city's policies and intentions. This activity, though commonplace, may be merged with other ceremonial and representational activities in the minds of many observers;
it was identified as a separate role by fewer than one fifth of the respondents. In these two activities, the mayor builds the extensive contact with the public and the media which can be a valuable resource in performing other roles. As Boynton and Wright (1971, p. 32) observed, the mayor's "unique relationship to the public provides him with leadership resources not available to any other . . . actors." As representative and spokesman, the mayor also becomes an important channel for citizen input. Wikstrom (1979, p. 274) found that 66% of the mayors in Virginia spent more than three (and 16% more than ten) hours per week dealing with citizen inquiries and complaints. In addition, the mayor serves as presiding officer at meetings, a role mentioned by half of the respondents. In so doing, he sets the tone for meetings and may exert mild influence over the timing and outcome of deliberations.

These traditional roles, sometimes perceived to be the full extent of the job, are important for establishing the relationships with the council and the public. The mayor also sends signals to staff about his attitudes toward them in his public conduct. This public demeanor can influence the nature of that key relationship. Some mayors never move beyond ceremony and presiding. For other mayors, additional activities that build on these foundation roles were also identified by respondents.

The mayor contributes to higher levels of communication and facilitates action by officials. Beyond the straightforward transmission of council views to the public, the mayor may also serve as an educator. Although only mentioned by 10% of the respondents, this role is conceptually distinct from spokesman or advocate (defined below). In his relations with the council, public and media, and/or manager and staff, the mayor, without promoting a favored position, identifies issues or problems for consideration, promotes awareness of important concerns, and seeks to promote understanding across the city by exchange or information.

As liaison with the manager, the mayor links the two major components of the system—the legislative body and administrative apparatus—and can facilitate communication and understanding between elected and appointed officials. The mayor increases the manager's awareness of council preferences and can predict how the council will react to administrative proposals. Although the manager must maintain positive relations with each member of the council, the mayor-manager interaction is an efficient way to exchange information. Despite the benefits that can be derived by filling this role, however, and its accessibility to the mayor, the liaison role is not necessarily filled. Over 70% of the respondents perceived the mayor to have a closer relationship to the manager than other council members, but only 29% cited liaison as a part of the mayor's performance.
Finally, 29% identified the mayor as a *team builder*, one who works to coalesce the council and build consensus. Wikstrom (1979, p. 275) found that "practically all mayors take the lead in promoting consensus when the council is divided over policy matters." Promoting cohesion is conceptually distinct from taking the group in a particular direction. The mayor as team leader seeks to promote full expression, help the council work through differences expeditiously, and encourage the council to face issues and resolve them decisively. Several managers noted that it is much easier to work with a council that operates in this fashion.

The roles considered so far have been concerned with communication and coordination, whereas the next group of roles involves influencing the direction of city government affairs and the content of policy. As *goal setter*—a role identified by 29% of the respondents—the mayor establishes goals and objectives for council and manager, identifies problems, and sets the tone for the council. Some mayors keep track of a set of key objectives so that the council and manager orient themselves to accomplishing these priority items. Thus, this role may encompass the accomplishment as well as the setting of goals. Similarly, Wikstrom (1979, p. 275) reports that 56% of the mayors in his study considered themselves to be primarily responsible for ensuring that the manager implements policies of the council.

In addition, the mayor may be active as an *organizer* and stabilizer of the key relations within city government. Although mentioned in only 14% of the interviews, the activities classified as organizing do not fit into any other role. The mayor guides the council to recognition of its roles and responsibilities. If the council has standing committees, the mayor can use appointments and assignments to advance his view of how the council should be operating. He helps to define the pattern of interaction between council and manager, monitors it, and makes adjustments in order to maintain the complex sharing and separation of responsibilities between the council and manager.

The mayor is uniquely situated to control that relationship and better able than any other official to correct it, if change is needed. For example, the mayor may advise the manager to bring more matters to the council or fewer; he may intervene with a council member who is intruding into operational matters; or he may seek to alleviate tension between the council and staff before a serious rift develops. The mayor may also undertake to augment the council's capacity for information and decision making vis-a-vis the manager. Some of Wilson's changes in San Diego were designed to enhance the role of both mayor and council.4 In the North

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4 The introduction of a committee system with consultants hired for each committee "enabled the council to develop, independent of the city manager, its own information, to draft ordinances, and to undertake special studies" (Sparrow, 1984, p. 6). In addition, the budget was reviewed by a fiscal analyst in the mayor's office and committee staff.
Carolina cities, the mayor often handles these organizing and stabilizing activities informally and in private. Indeed, a number of respondents noted that the mayor's ability to make such adjustments out of the glare of publicity is one of his greatest resources with sunshine laws that limit private deliberations among elected officials.

Finally, the mayor was perceived to be a policy advocate by 33% of the respondents. As an active guide in policy-making, the mayor develops programs and lines up support or organizes opposition to proposals. In these activities, the mayor most closely resembles the executive mayor's public persona as the city's problem solver. In addition, the mayor may influence policy choices of other actors. Wikstrom (1979, p. 274) reports that two-thirds of the managers informally discuss major issues with the mayor before submitting a proposal to the council. The same proportion of managers "sensed that council members usually followed the policy posture of the mayor." Thus, the mayor's role in advocating and shaping policies may be based on all the other roles, or pursued to the exclusion of others.

Conceptually distinct from the preceding are the mayor's activities in promoting and defending the city. This was the most commonly mentioned role—by 36%—beyond the foundation roles. The mayor may be involved in external relations and help secure agreement among parties to a project. For some mayors, the promoter role is a simple extension of ceremonial tasks. Others are active initiators of contacts and help develop possibilities for the city. As official representative, the mayor has extensive dealings with officials in other governments and may serve as a key participant in formulating agreements with state or federal officials, developers, and others who seek joint ventures with city government. The mayor may also take the lead in projecting a favorable image of the city and seek to "sell" others on investment in it. This role has contributed to the emergence of the mayor as a central figure in council-manager government (George, 1984).

Finally, 10% of the respondents mentioned activities that involved directing staff: issuing orders, requesting reports, and monitoring the performance of certain department heads. These actions, unlike those discussed in the previous dimensions, may constitute interference with the prerogatives of the manager and contradict the norms of the form of government. The mayor's activities in administration, Boynton and Wright (1971, p. 31) note, may "conflict with," "displace," or "complement the manager's activities."

Care should be taken to distinguish between administrative actions that are part of the extensive traffic between elected officials and staff and those which constitute executive control. Mayors and councils are involved in complaint handling, oversight, making and implementing
decisions, adjusting program regulations, and occasionally efforts to steer
services to particular recipients (Abney and Lauth, 1982a; Greene, 1982;
Svara, 1984). Furthermore, councils also contribute to decisions
concerning management and operations. Thus, the mayor deals with
administrative and management matters in the coordinative and guidance
roles already discussed. For example, when a mayor seeks information
from the manager and staff “on behalf of solicitous councils” regarding
the “implementation and success of a policy,” a common occurrence
according to Wikstrom (1979, p. 275), he may be filling the liaison, goal
setter, or organizer role, depending on how he handles the inquiry. The
actions encompassed by the role of directing staff are limited to direct
interaction between the mayor and staff to receive specific products, such
as reports, or to produce specific results, such as change in the
performance of a department. Defined in this narrow way, mayors are
rarely perceived to be active in administration.

The most pronounced form of administrative direction is assuming
control over the manager. If the mayor chooses the manager and defines
the scope of the office, as Sparrow claims happened under Wilson, the
mayor becomes the de facto executive officer with the manager acting
as an administrative officer to the mayor. The role of selecting the manager
can be added to the eleven identified by the respondents in North Carolina
to form a comprehensive list of potential roles.

TYPES OF LEADERSHIP

What kind of mayoral leadership is provided by an incumbent depends
on which roles the mayor performs and how well he handles them. There
is infinite variety in the combinations of activities pursued by individual
mayors, but certain general types have emerged from this and previous
research. Mayors develop a leadership type for themselves by the way
they combine the five dimensions of leadership. In figure 1, the twelve
roles are used as an ex post facto inventory of the scope of leadership
provided by the mayors in the five North Carolina cities. The proportion
of respondents mentioning activities associated with each role provides
a profile of the salient aspects of leadership in each city. For comparison,
a column is added to reflect the roles filled by Mayor Wilson of San Diego,
as inferred from Sparrow’s description.

It is apparent that the performance of more demanding roles is not
evenly distributed among the cities. The mayor may invest so little in the
office and define its scope so narrowly that he simply is a caretaker—a
uniformly underdeveloped type of leadership.\(^7\) This was the kind of

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\(^7\) Maier (1966, p. 37) uses caretaker in the same way. Kotter and Lawrence (1974, ch. 7)
classify the “ceremonial pattern” as the “minimum” mayor, and consider the “caretaker”
Figure 1
ACTIVITIES AND LEADERSHIP TYPES OF COUNCIL-MANAGER MAYORS

Proportion of Respondents Noting That Mayor Engaged in Role in Five Study Cities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ROLES</th>
<th>CITY:</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
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<td>12. SELECTS MANAGER</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓ (1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>11. DIRECTS STAFF</td>
<td>XXX(1)</td>
<td>XX</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td>10. PROMOTES CITY</td>
<td>XXX</td>
<td>XXX</td>
<td></td>
<td>XXXXXX</td>
<td></td>
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<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td>9. ADVOCATES POLICY</td>
<td>XXXX</td>
<td>XXXXXXXXX</td>
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<td>XXX</td>
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<td>8. ORGANIZES R'SHIPS</td>
<td>XX</td>
<td>XXX</td>
<td></td>
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<td>✓</td>
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<td>7. SETS GOALS</td>
<td>XXXXX</td>
<td>XXXXXXXXX</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. FORMS TEAM</td>
<td>XXXXX</td>
<td>XXX</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>XX</td>
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<td>5. LIAISON W/MGR</td>
<td>XXXX</td>
<td>XXXX</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>XXXXXXXXXX</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<td>4. EDUCATES</td>
<td>XX</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. PRESIDES</td>
<td>XXXX</td>
<td>XXXXXXXXX</td>
<td>XXXX</td>
<td>XXXXX</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. SPOKESMAN</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>XXX</td>
<td>XX</td>
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<tr>
<td>1. CEREMONIAL TASKS</td>
<td>XXXXXXXXX</td>
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<th>CITY:</th>
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<td>n = 13</td>
<td>n = 12</td>
<td>n = 13</td>
<td>n = 6</td>
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</tr>
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TYPES OF LEADERSHIP AND ROLES FILLED

CARETAKER: No roles fully developed
SYMBOlic HEAD: Roles 1-3
COORDINATOR: Roles 1-6
PROMOTER: Roles 1-3, 10
ACTIVIST/REFORMER: Roles 1-3, 7-10
DIRECTOR: Roles 1-10
CHIEF EXECUTIVE: Roles 1-12

(1) For study cities in North Carolina, each X represents that 10 percent of the respondents mentioned that activity in response to an open-ended question, "What are the responsibilities and roles of the mayor in [name of city]?"
(2) * indicates that this activity was attributed to the mayor of San Diego by Sparrow (1964).
(3) In this city, seven interviews were conducted before the inclusion of the question concerning the mayor.
leadership provided by Mayor Redding of Oakland as described by Pressman. For most mayors, the presiding and ceremonial tasks are inescapable because legally required or an integral part of the job. A mayor who fills these roles actively but performs no others can be called the symbolic head of government. The mayor in city C demonstrates this type of leadership: he was perceived to be filling virtually no other roles. Although such mayors preside and attend to the interactions with the public, their narrowly defined leadership does not address division within the council, and the manager’s influence is likely to expand. Mayor Redding’s limited leadership and the manager’s extensive influence in Oakland presumably were mutually reinforcing, although it is also possible that individual council members will intrude excessively in the manager’s sphere in this situation.

If the next set of roles is performed as well, the mayor becomes coordinator. Pursuing these activities effectively contributes to a smoothly functioning council-manager government with strong elected leadership. The council does not necessarily work together well, nor do the council, manager, and public necessarily interact smoothly without coordinative leadership from the mayor. The coordinator is a team leader, keeps the manager and council in touch, and interacts with the public and outside agencies—all contributing to improved communication. He helps to achieve high levels of shared information, but since he is weak in policy guidance, he contributes little to policy formulation (at least, no more than any other member of the council.) The coordinator is not a complete type of leadership since the organizing and guidance roles are not part of the mayor’s repertoire. The mayor in city E represents this type in part. He is perceived as providing liaison with the manager, although the perception of his team leadership is less common.

A third incomplete type of leadership was found in the study cities, and a fourth (with two variants) can be defined even though it was not observed in pure form in these cities. The mayor in city D is a specialized promoter. This mayor provides effective guidance in that single role. Observers give him high marks for bringing together support from state and federal sources, drawing upon extensive political activities and governmental service prior to becoming mayor, and commitments from the private sector, with which he has strong occupational ties. The extraordinary contributions to promoting the city are not matched by effectiveness at activities in other roles. The specialized promoter leaves to be more active. This approach does not seem appropriate because the caretaker, who does not develop any dimension of leadership fully, would not project a positive image of the city and would make government less known and accessible to the public. Thus, the symbolic head in the typology presented in this paper would make a greater contribution, albeit a limited one, than the caretaker.
a vacuum of responsibility for tasks involving coordination, organization, and policy guidance. In city D, the manager must pay more attention to these activities. As indicated in figure 1, the mayors in cities A and B are also commonly perceived to be promoters, so this type of leadership does have to be a specialty. Indeed, hard times and increasing competition among cities virtually force this role on the mayor.

The fourth type is similar to Kotter and Lawrence's (1974, pp. 112-15) personality-individualist mayor. The activist or reformer type emphasizes policy guidance and advocacy but neglects coordinative activities, especially team building, essentially going it alone. The activist wants to get things accomplished quickly, and succeeds by force of his personality and the presence of a working majority. Although influential, the activist is viewed by some members of the council (perhaps even his own supporters) as abrasive and exclusionary in his leadership. The tenure of this type of mayor is marked by successful policy initiatives along with friction and disgruntlement among the council members. Too much emphasis on the policy roles can induce a mayor to overreach his position and alienate the council. Such a mayor would then fall into the reformer type of leadership, which is possible for any mayor who ignores or maladroitly handles the tasks of coordination. Such mayors stress the policy enunciation activity, but are not very successful at securing acceptance of their ideas (Maier, 1966, p. 37).

The director is a complete type of mayor who not only contributes to smooth functioning of government but also provides a general sense of direction. A primary responsibility of the council is to determine the mission of city government and its broad goals. The director contributes significantly to consideration of broad questions of purpose. One former mayor observed that "my toughest job was keeping the council's attention on the horizon rather than on the potholes." The mayors in Cities A and B demonstrate this comprehensive type of leadership.

This mayor stands out as a leader in the eyes of the council, the press, and the public, and uses that recognition as the basis for guidance rather than control. He enhances the influence of elected officials by unifying the council, filling the policy vacuum that can exist on the council, and guiding policy toward goals that meet the needs of the community. Furthermore, he is actively involved in monitoring and adjusting relationships within city government to maintain balance, cooperation, and high standards. No one else can attack the causes of friction between

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8 The leadership of the mayor in city B, according to a few respondents there, is eroding in the "middle." Although once proficient at team leadership which provided the basis for policy guidance, he has tended to concentrate more on the latter than the former. There is the risk that mayors after some time in office will forget that the council's support is essential to their policy leadership.
the council and manager (which may be produced by failing of either party) or promote the constructive interaction that is needed for effective performance. This mayor does not supplant the manager's prerogatives or diminish his leadership, although this mayor is occasionally perceived to be directing staff. Wikstrom (1979, p. 274) has observed that "managers prefer a mayor who provides policy leadership and direction." This type of leader avoids trying to take over the manager's responsibilities. The organizer role is oriented toward enhancing the ability of the manager to function as the chief executive officer. In sum, although the director does not become the driving force as the executive mayor can be, he is the guiding force in city government.

The contrast is clearly seen in Sparrow's portrait of Wilson as a chief executive, a final type of leadership. In addition to the changes which augmented the role of the entire council, Wilson added a fiscal analyst in his office, handled certain federal programs (CETA, Model Cities, and General Revenue Sharing), and used his appointment power over council committees and members of boards and commissions to expand his control over policy formation and administration. The most striking change in power was acquiring the de facto ability to hire the city manager, presumably by driving out those who did not adjust to his leadership style and influencing appointments until he found those who did. Sparrow concludes that Wilson achieved through informal means the concentration of power in the mayor's office which the voters had refused to approve in a charter change in 1973. Wilson displayed comprehensive leadership across all roles, developing positive relations with the public and expanding the council's role. He strengthened not only his own office but the exercise of collective leadership by the entire council as well.

In sum, the analysis suggests that a mayor is able to fashion a unique type of leadership by the roles which he chooses (or happens) to develop. Certain types are cumulative, building on the successful exercise of more easily accomplished roles. To be a successful director or chief executive, it is necessary to maintain strong support from the council and the public, sustained by the performance of traditional and coordinative roles. The existence of incomplete types indicates that some mayors do not adopt more difficult roles—the ceremonial heads and coordinators—or experience the consequences of emphasizing higher ranking roles over lower ones—the activist, reformer, and specialized promoter. Such variation directs attention to the factors that influence adoption of different roles and success in filling them.

Preconditions of Effective Leadership

The resources needed to fill the mayor's office suggested in previous research fall into those formal and informal resources which determine
the nature of the office and those which define performance within the office. Among the former, Pressman (1972, p. 512) stressed financial and staff support for the mayor and salary to make the job full-time, extensive governmental functional scope and mayoral jurisdiction over those functions, backing from political organizations, and access to friendly media. Analysis of the North Carolina cities suggests different bases for a distinctive form of leadership which does not depend on a superior power position. Unless the mayor wishes to assume the chief executive type of leadership, there are resources available in the council-manager form to develop leadership in the areas of coordination and policy guidance. Thus, the strategic location occupied by the mayor becomes an important precondition in itself. Mayors with a clear conception of the job—its possibilities, interdependencies, and limitations—are more likely to be able to take advantage of this resource.

Many studies stress the importance of personal qualities in determining the inclination of individuals to seek leadership and their ability to exercise it. Energy, resourcefulness, contacts and connections, ability to communicate, a clear sense of purpose, and the ability to keep sight of broad goals while making specific choices are important for leadership in any setting. These qualities must be channeled, however, into appropriate role behavior. In council-manager governments, the foundation roles—ceremonial and presiding activities, education, liaison, and team building—support goal setting, organizing, policy advocacy, and promotion. The highly committed, assertive, and impatient mayor may jump into the higher level roles without developing the others, but runs the risk of having only short-term success or being an isolated reformer.

If the mayor is inclined to fill the roles that make up the director type of leadership, other preconditions for leadership follow. The mayor must be effective at working with others and delegate certain responsibilities to them. Inclusiveness, sharing of information, facilitation of the expression of divergent views, and ability to resolve differences are important traits for the mayor to have in his dealings with the council. The relationship with the manager requires tact, respect, ability to share authority, and trust in the manager’s commitment to advance the goals of the city and to achieve the highest performance from government as a whole. The mayor is not necessarily the counterweight to an autonomous professional.

Finally, mayors need to be flexible and capable of shifting the emphasis they place on different roles. More than any other official in this form of government, the mayor is the stabilizer who acts in those areas in which contributions are needed at a given time. He will be more or less central, more or less public, more or less assertive as conditions warrant. He will
mayor-centered systems this discussion, but certain consequences of a shift toward greater mayoral influence may be suggested. The emergence of mayor-centered systems

**Implications**

Council-manager mayors can contribute substantially to the performance of their governments and the betterment of their communities. The position is not a pale imitation of the executive mayor's office in a mayor-council city, but rather a unique leadership position that requires distinctive qualities. Preconditions for leadership include opportunities for coordination and policy guidance present in the form, personal resourcefulness and drive, and, at the same time, self-restraint, commitment to enhance the position of other participants in the governmental process, and flexibility. The lesson for mayors from this research is that effective leadership is built upon strengthening the other participants in the governing process rather than controlling or supplanting them.

The San Diego case demonstrates that it is possible for the mayor to move beyond coordinative and guidance roles to acquire control over other actors in the system. Sparrow (1984, p. 8) asserts that such leadership "has become the preferred form." Two questions arise: whether this is an efficacious strategy for other council-manager mayors, and whether it is preferable. It is not likely that such a leadership type will be sustained permanently without formal changes in the legal position of the office, such as those which Wilson originally sought. For every mayor who successfully sustains sufficient council support to chart an independent course and significantly supplant the manager, it seems likely that many will wind up "reformers"—isolated and ineffective. The director type of leadership is comprehensive as well, and also more compatible with the form of government, and thus likely to be more easily achieved and more stable.

Even if possible, the creation of executive mayors in this form may not be desirable. The council-manager plan differs from governing arrangements based on separation of powers. The strengths and weaknesses of each form are topics which extend beyond the scope of this discussion, but certain consequences of a shift toward greater mayoral influence may be suggested. The emergence of mayor-centered systems
of governance in council-manager cities is likely to produce greater conflict between the council and the mayor and create ambiguities about the lines of authority between each set of elected officials and the manager. The experience of mayor-council cities suggests that dependency on a single leader chosen through the electoral process to provide broad-ranging leadership can lead to poor performance as well as spectacular success. The council-manager government may be less capable of resolving conflict or coalescing divergent interests, because it lacks a single leader who can forge compromises, a weakness noted by Banfield and Wilson (1963). If this form has a mayor who provides comprehensive leadership (without assuming executive control), however, a council-manager city has the advantages that accrue from blending the distinct talents of elected officials and professional administrators and may evidence greater consistency in governmental performance. There are a host of other potential differences in proactivity, responsiveness, effectiveness, equity, and efficiency between the forms of urban government. The advantages concerning quality of leadership, however, are not one-sided.

The roles and leadership typology presented here provide the framework for further case studies and comparative research on this important office. Mayors, council members, and administrators can be surveyed using this comprehensive inventory to determine the extent of activity in each role and the effectiveness of performance. The type of leadership can be determined by examining the range of roles filled. Beyond cities, the approach can also be used in studying similar positions in other governments with governing board-appointed executive form of organization. This form is used extensively in counties, and almost exclusively in school and other special districts. The presiding officer of these various boards may fill any number of the roles identified for mayors. Such studies will expand our understanding of non-executive political heads of government whose leadership is based on coordination and policy guidance.

REFERENCES


MAYORAL LEADERSHIP IN COUNCIL-MANAGER CITIES


THE POLICYMAKING ROLE OF THE MAYOR IN COUNCIL-MANAGER CITIES: DETRACTING AND ENHANCING FACTORS

Gwendolyn Voelpel
MPA Student Capstone
University of Nebraska Omaha
Summer 2007
Executive summary

Municipal reform turned the traditional view of the mayor as the supreme leader of cities upside down with the National League of Cities’ Model City Charter of 1915. The council-manager form unites legislative authority in the City Council and reserves administrative authority for the city manager.

Today, nearly half of U.S. cities with more than 2,500 residents operate under the council-manager or “weak mayor” form—surpassing adoption or retention of the mayor-council or “strong mayor” form. The form of government, however, is not without its opponents. Challenges to council-manager cities are plentiful, averaging one form of government change effort every five years according to one International City-County Management Association survey.

A healthy percentage of the discontent with council-manager cities stems from the subordination of the mayor in the polity. Numerous studies confirm that the city manager and council members play a vital policymaking role while the mayor only ekes out a bit part. Council members and the city manager are leaders in budget development, recommendation or initiation of policy and recommendations. The mayor is sidelined. While some forms show adaptations to the realities of the shared responsibility for policy—council, mayor and city manager—debate continues today regarding delineating administrative and policy functions in council-manager cities.

Yet not every mayor performs in the same manner even in the same form of government. Researchers have recognized that the mayor in council-manager cities can be “the first among equals” and a powerful leader of a different ilk than in strong mayor forms. So what factors influence the policy role of mayors in council-manager cities? Can relative policy leadership roles be predicted by analysis of other factors, such as tenure of the city manager and council members or size of council?

Through an online survey of council-manager cities in Washington, this study probed the various policymaking possibilities and roles to determine factors that enhance or detract from the mayor’s role. The expectations for findings were:

- Positive relationship between mayoral direct election and mayoral policy leadership
- Positive relationship between mayoral tenure and mayoral policy leadership
- Negative relationship between tenure of city manager and mayoral policy leadership
- Negative relationship between expertise of city manager in profession and mayoral policy leadership
- Negative relationship between tenure of council members and mayoral policy leadership
- Negative relationship between number of council members and mayoral policy leadership
- Negative relationship between number of council committees and mayoral policy leadership

In some cases, data did support the hypotheses. In five of the nine policy activities, the city manager was seen as the strongest policy actor. The remaining four were led by Council. In addition, mayors with council members with shorter tenures appeared to enjoy more policy leadership.

In the case of the tenure of the city manager, both in the profession and in one city, the results were mixed. For city managers with 8+ years serving a city, the role of the city manager in advocating policy in the community was significantly lower, as was building consensus with elected officials. Stronger policy roles for city managers with longer tenure in one city included proposing new policies, developing the budget and serving as an intergovernmental liaison. The mayor’s role in advocating policy and building consensus with elected officials increased significantly to fill the gap left by the city manager’s retreat from those areas. In other areas, however, the mayor’s role decreased significantly—in proposing new policies and developing the city budget, for instance.
For city managers with 21+ years of experience in the profession compared to all city managers in the survey pool, the impact appeared to be negligible. However, the role of advocating policy in the community, setting long-term fiscal priorities and building consensus with elected officials on policy showed less perceived involvement by long-term city managers. In those cases, it appears that the city manager deferred that role to the council. Therefore, the findings split more finely with some policymaking roles increasing for the mayor with professional, experienced city managers and some decreasing.

Insufficient data was collected to cull information about the relationship of mayoral direct election, tenure of the mayor, number of council members and presence of council committees.

Although inconclusive in some areas, the study does support the theory that the mayor plays a lesser role in policy leadership than the city manager and city council members. The implications of the split in roles for a city manager with much expertise in the profession and tenure with one city are unclear. However, the findings may point to a seasoned veteran backing off more overt and public policy leadership roles in favor of safer ground in the policy-administration discussion. In addition, the findings did show that newer council members seem to allow more of a policy role for the mayor while longer tenured members decreased the mayor’s role and increased the city manager’s—possibly due to a learning curve where members become aware of the relative vigor of each role.

As many cities struggle with the “right” form of government, the debate concerning the policy-administration divide continues. Yet little attention seems to be paid to the variances within council-manager forms. To preserve the vitality of the reformed city, more study needs to pinpoint possible factors such as term limits, dedicated mayor-council staff, part-time vs. full-time mayors and the election of council members at large or by ward or district. In addition, the adapted form deserves careful consideration as the possible next evolution of the council-manager form, taking the best from one form and mixing it with the best from the other to create the most efficient and democratic model of city governance.
The images of the offices of the American mayor and the city manager found in the literature of public administration and political science are related to the realities of those offices in much the same way as Smokey the Bear is related to the grizzly bear of the Northwest. The literary figures are benign, simplified caricatures of complex and not completely tameable realities (Boynton & Wright, 1971, 28).

Introduction

Who rules our cities? What is the best form of municipal government? There were approximately 7,500 cities in the United States in 2004 (Fredrickson, Johnson & Wood, 2004). A good number of them struggle with those questions every year. The debate about the structure of local government and their respective ability to provide “rational administration” vs. “political responsiveness” has raged over many decades (Box, 1995, 711). In a 2001 survey by the International City/County Management Association, city governments had averaged one attempt to change the structure or form of government in the previous five years (International City/County Management Association, 2001). By 2006, 49% of cities with more than 2,500 residents operated under the council-manager form and 43% under the mayor-council form (International City/County Management Association, 2006). Considerable academic and professional expertise has been expended comparing and contrasting the two structures to determine how leadership roles are defined and exercised.

With nearly a 50/50 split between the two dominant city structures, the debate about form of government flares up in the academic literature and at polls in communities all over the country at regular intervals. The zero-sum game does not aid either the manager or mayor in more effectively serving their communities. Federalism severely restricts the authority at the local government level (Schragger, 2006). Policy making power has become increasingly important as the federal government continues to withdraw monetary support and devolve programs, pushing responsibility to the local level without accompanying funding. As creatures with powers only as assigned by the state government, cities play on a very narrow field. The chief executive, whether mayor or manager, is a pivotal player in urban policymaking (Morgan, England & Pelissero, 2007, 92). Infighting over roles only diffuses power in the policymaking arena. Furthermore, role arguments may lead to frequent re-evaluations of forms of government that ultimately throw communities into disarray.

The battleground of form-of-government debates often zeros in on the ideal vs. real roles of elected officials and appointed officials in policymaking. The skirmishes often stem from a misunderstanding of separation of powers in municipal governance. The concept is a take-off on the early writings of Woodrow Wilson regarding separation of the executive, legislative and judicial branches in U.S. government. The politics-administration model, an adaptation of the separation of powers, seeks to keep administration separate from politics (Montjoy & Watson, 1995). In its many interpretations, the definition of politics has become synonymous with policy making, creating a level of angst with the city administrator’s considerable role in policy formulation. Yet the basis for such arguments is faulty.

The misunderstanding began a century or more ago. The Progressive Era between the 1880’s and 1920’s sought to curb corruption and counteract patronage systems while inserting a level of professionalism and efficiency into city management. In 1915, the municipal reform effort reached a seminal point when the National Municipal League’s Model City Charter proposed changes to city government structure to unify the executive powers and create division between executive and legislative functions. The council-manager form of government was seen as the antithesis of the strong mayor or mayor-council form, which centralized administrative and legislative authority in one individual. The council-manager form made the executive role the purview of the city manager and shared the legislative role between the mayor and council. Contrary to modern day interpretations, the model was a “unity of powers” not a “separation of powers” reform. Writing for the International City Managers’ Association in 1958, Ridley asserted
that “In spite of what some of the early theorists and practitioners said, the council-manager plan does not provide for checks and balances nor a separation of powers” (1).

The model’s plan is for the mayoral post to be the titular head and that policy-making is a collective function of the council. Officially, the mayor is still limited to presiding over council meetings and ceremonially representing the city (Boynton & Wright, 1971). With the advent of the reformed municipal government, some saw the mayor reduced to largely ceremonial acts or, more generously, as taking on the role of chairman of the board (Svara, 1987). In this iteration of municipal governance, the mayor was no longer the strong policy leader, instead becoming the “first among equals” on the council (Bebout, 1955). The once-powerful chief executive is often perceived as being relegated to the role of ribbon cutter. The traditional tension between the administrative leader in the form of the city manager and the once-undisputed legislative leader in the form of the mayor becomes unhealthy as mayors are termed “weak” or “strong” based on their relative policymaking roles.

While the rapid growth in council-manager cities may be over (Fredrickson, Johnson & Wood, 2004), the questions about appropriate roles of the chief appointed official of a city remains vital to the effectiveness of municipal management. Tensions surface questions as to whether the city manager will continue in a policy role if it threatens tenure (Banovetz, 1994) or if elected officials’ expanding administrative roles threaten the manager’s authority (Svara, 1989; Nalbandian, 1990). In the early years of the implementation of the new model city charger, the city managers’ professional organization provided very strict guidance to city managers regarding their policymaking role. In 1924, the line between policy makers and administration was very clear in the International City Managers’ Association Code of Ethics. However, the lines have blurred over the years as the manager’s role in policymaking has been recognized. By 1952, the association called the manager a “community leader” who submits policy proposal and provides facts and advice to council on policy matters (ICMA, 1968, 93-94).

The evolution of the city managers’ own code of conduct is a clear indicator of the development of the city manager’s policy making role. The academic community also watched the debate closely and weighed in at regular intervals. The once strict dichotomy separating administrative and policymaking tasks fell out of favor as scholars realized that city managers had significant roles in recommending policies and leading communities (Adrian, 1969; Stillman, 1977; Newell & Ammons, 1987; Svara, 1989). By the early 1990’s, some were seeing the city manager as the primary policy actor (Morgan & Watson, 1992). Others went so far as to recognize the manager as a politician (Bosworth, 1958). The International City-County Management Association, in its introductory text for city managers, advocate for a shared model of policymaking. Even in “strong mayor” forms, the roles of the mayor and manager have become intermingled so much as to make strict separation nonsensical (Ebdon & Brucato, 2000). Mayors often hire chief administrative officers to run the day-to-day business of the city. On the other side of the policy-administration equation, the mayor’s individual power is enhanced in council-manager forms when the mayor is directly elected by voters and not by council.

The formal adaptation of forms of government and roles is indicative of the ongoing debate and discomfort with the melding of roles of the mayor and manager or chief administrative officer. Yet it is unclear that the overlapping or customization of the mayor and manager roles is the primary factors impacting policy activities of mayors in council-manager cities. The more relevant questions may be:
1) Does the mayor, council members or city manager perform more of the traditional policy leadership roles?
2) Do council standing committees weaken the role of the mayor in a council-manager city?
3) Do larger councils take influence away from the mayor?
4) Do council members with longer tenures decrease the power of the mayor?
5) Does the tenure of the city manager negatively interact with the policy leadership of the mayor?

The International City-County Management Association regularly surveys its members on the "state of the profession." An adaptation of that survey tool and academic literature review will provide the basis for a survey of cities in Washington to probe the relationship between various factors and the role of the mayor in Washington's council-manager cities.

**Municipal policymaking: politics vs. administration**

The policy process in cities is a complex and often convoluted negotiation among numerous actors with varying values. A wide range of interests—individual and group—may marshal the forces to place policy issues on the city’s agenda or impact the outcomes of deliberations. Those policy actors may include business leaders, neighborhood groups, social service advocates, advisory citizen committees to the council and state legislators. The chief elected and chief appointed officials often play primary roles as negotiators and power brokers to bring those interests together. Council members traditionally play a lesser role in policy initiation and formulation, especially in council-manager cities (Adrian, 1958).

The historical assumption in public administration was that elected officials make policy and managers implement it. It was thought that a “hard-and-fast line” could be drawn between the two types of officials in council-manager cities based on policy roles (Ridley, 1958; Rosenbloom, 1993; Svara, 1985). The attempt to clearly delineate policymaking from administration has spawned decades of professional dialogue and study in academic and professional literature. Although the fallacy of clear separation in municipal government no longer holds (Stillman, 1977; Svara, 1985; Newell & Ammons, 1987; Nalbandian, 1991; ICMA, 1993; Watson & Hassett, 2002), a general understanding of what constitutes “policy,” “politics” and “administration” remains a necessary evil in developing an analytical framework.

Early public administration authors often discussed politics and policy as if the terms were interchangeable. Goodnow’s writings in 1900 in *Politics and Administration* in particular blurred the lines between the two. However, Goodnow himself offers a definition of politics that makes it clear that policymaking in itself does not constitute politics. The definition is his tome speaks to politics as the organization of a party among its citizens including “marshaling voters, and obtaining and distributing public patronage.” (Goodnow, 1900, 19). Using this definition, Montjoy and Watson (1995) posit that removing party politics from administration does not equate to removing all policy making activities from administration.

Policy can be generally defined as a set of principles or program of actions adopted by a person, group, or government. They provide a basis for action (Ridley, 1958). A more specific definition is “how to spend government revenues, whether to initiate new programs or create new offices, and how to distribute services at what level” (Svara, 1989). A simplistic description of the policymaking process involves just three stages: 1) raising the issue or initiating policy; 2) consideration of a proposed course of action; 3) making the ultimate policy decision by approving, modifying or rejecting the proposal (Ridley, 1958, 13).

Administration is perhaps the easiest term to define. It can generally be described as organizing people and resources to carry out assigned tasks. Or, as Svara (1989) defines it: “specific decisions, regulations, and practices employed to achieve policy objectives.”

**Major city policy decisions and administrative actions**

In 1971, Boynton and Wright listed the major elements of city policy authority as:
- formal role in the preparation, submission or execution of the budget
- appointment of department heads
- veto over council actions
- formal power over council agenda or recommendation of policy
- appointments to citizen advisory boards and committees
In the International City/County Management Association’s regular surveys on the profession, elements of policymaking probed include very formal powers—such as the power of the mayor to break ties on the council, propose policy or veto measures. It also includes:

- Assigning council members to chair or serve on committees
- Appointing citizens to serve on advisory or quasi-judicial authorities, boards or commissions
- Receiving the annual budget and comment/make suggestions
- Making an annual report to the council and citizens on the state of the community
- Initiating the hiring and/or involuntary termination of the chief appointed official

In a model developed by Svara after a study of North Carolina cities in 1989, policy activities included budget formulation, budget review and approval. The budget in particular is recognized as a primary policy document of city government (Ridley, 1958). Morgan and Watson (1992) expanded the list of actions connoting policy authority to include and distinguish between formal and informal power. The new iteration added activities otherwise considered “ceremonial” to the list, including acting as a media representative and lobbying state legislators. In some cities, council committees further diffuse the policymaking role (Ridley, 1958). Other elements have also gained favor as indicators of mayoral power. In particular, the mayor’s right to vote with the council, veto council actions, the tenure of the mayor and direct election of mayors have been argued to impact the balance of leadership powers in cities (Kammerer, 1964; Wikstrom, 1979).

Some have tried to define the city administrator’s role as specifically just execution of policies handled down from politics (Sayre, 1958). Others have made it clear that administration includes elements of policy making and policy execution (Ridley, 1958). Administration and management activities may include service delivery involvement, hiring or promotional decisions about staff, determining formulas for allocating services, handling complaints from citizens and employees and adopting policies for internal management (Svara, 1989). It is the “day-to-day administration” the city manager was originally intended to handle when the reformers adopted the model city charter.

**Administrator’s role in policymaking**

There are two primary forms of municipal government—the council-manager and mayor-council forms. Commission and town meeting forms still exist, but are very rare today (ICMA, 2001). Typical council-manager cities include a council of between five and nine representatives elected on a non-partisan basis, some at large and some by ward or district. The council serves as the chief policymaking body of the city by approving ordinances, policy and budget. The council appoints a chief executive—city manager or chief administrative officer—who carries out policy and is responsible for administrative functions while serving at the pleasure of the council (Stillman, 1977). The mayor-council form includes a mayor elected at large. The mayor serves as the chief administrative officer. The council, often elected in a mix of at-large and district elections, is the legislative body. The council adopts policies which the mayor then carries out.

However well recognized the city manager’s role in administration is, the role in policymaking is often neglected (Ridley, 1958, 7). City managers operate in a political environment by design (Watson & Hassett, 2002). The role of the city manager/administrator in policymaking has evolved (Svara, 1985; Banovetz, 1994), but from the early days there was clear understanding of the difference between partisan politics and policymaking. City managers were advised to use their “political sense without being involved in partisan political questions” (Ridley, 3). Strict confinement of the city manager to administration appears to be the established early view (Schragger, 2006). The International City Managers’ Association Code of Ethics in 1924 stated: “It is the council, the elected representatives of the people, who primarily determine municipal policies and are entitled to the credit for their fulfillment.” However, a 1938 revision to the code started blurring the lines, recognizing early on the city manager’s policy. The 1938 code states: “In order that policy may be intelligent and effective, he (the manager) provides the
council with information and advice (on policy matters).” Although this does not propose a policy initiation role, it is nonetheless a vital role in policy formulation. In the 1952 code revision, the manager was called a community leader who “submits policy proposals to the council and provides the council with facts and advice on matters of policy to give the council a basis for making decisions on community goals” (ICMA, 1968, 93-94). In 1969 the International City-County Management Association recognized a role for the manager in “developing and analyzing alternatives for the council’s consideration.”

Whether or not the professional organization recognized the emerging role of the manager/administrator in policymaking, it obviously was occurring in practice. In a 1958 survey, 77 of 88 managers indicated they initiated policy regularly (Ridley, 19). In a 1980 National League of Cities Survey, 38% of the council members in council-manager cities rated the manager as main source of policy initiation in comparison to 41% who rated themselves and 7% who rated the mayor as the main source. Traditionally, city managers have a wide scope of influence in policy implementation and some policy making (Svara, 1989; Morgan & Watson, 1992; Banovetz, 1994). City managers’ calendars support that conclusion. In a 1985 survey (Newell & Ammons), city managers reported that they 32% of their time on policy development; 32% on community leadership and relations with officials outside government and the council 17% and the remainder on management.

Some are even bolder, asserting that the city manager is indeed a political leader (Kammerer, Nalbandian & Portillo, 2006). Yet the policy role is dicey territory for the manager (Nalbandian, 1990). In the primer for city managers, the primary source of conflict between managers and council is “for the manager to overstep his or her bounds and become too involved in policymaking or politics” (ICMA, 1993). Accounts from city managers across the country point to the difficulty of being defined by charters and laws on one hand and being asked to play substantial policymaking roles on the other (Nalbandian, 1990). Other studies second that, finding political turmoil to be a primary factor influencing city managers’ tenure (Whitaker & DeHoog, 1990; Renner, 2001). Even the Code of Ethics, once unambiguous, once again indicates a retreat overtly recognizing the centrality of the manager’s role in policymaking. The most recent revision, in 2004, includes a tenet: “Recognize that elected representatives of the people are entitled to the credit for the establishment of local government policies; responsibility for policy execution rests with the members.”

**Mayor’s role in policymaking**

The policy role for the manager or administrator may create considerable conflict with the mayor. The once powerful chief executive found the role eviscerated in the council-manager form. The derogatory categorization of mayors as “strong” or “weak” based on their relative powers can not but infuriate a popularly elected official. In addition, the mayor is often elected to office based on requests by constituents. The mayor then feels compelled to try to fulfill those campaign promises by bringing legislative powers into alignment with citizen expectations (Schrager, 2006). In the often ceremonial role of mayor in council-manager cities, the mayor will become frustrated with attempts to influence both the council and the manager in carrying out those campaign promises.

In surveys of formal mayoral power, it appears clear that the mayor does predominantly serve as a figurehead. A 1968 survey of municipalities by the International City Managers’ Association probed the role of the mayor. The range of roles taken on by the mayor was found to include:

1. ceremonial tasks
2. spokesman
3. presides
4. educates
5. liaison with manager
6. forms team
7. sets goals
8. organizes relationships
9. advocates policy
10. promotes city
11. directs staff
12. selects manager (ICMA, 1968)

The most common activity of mayors in that survey by far was acting in ceremonial and
presiding officer roles—83% of cities indicated their mayor played ceremonial roles and 52% as
presiding officer. In the real policymaking activities such as advocating policy and goal setting,
the numbers were lower. Just fewer than 30% witnessed goal setting by mayors, 13% saw
organizing and 33% saw policy advocate activities. One study in Virginia found that policy
leadership, including council leadership, were primary activities of the chief elected official
(Wikstrom, 1979, 273). However, that study only requested information from the mayors
themselves.

Surveys that rely on only formal models of power and influence may be inadequate. Although
the survey found most cities fit the model with shared policymaking roles between the council
and mayor, the mayor was most likely to:

- have the most contact with political party leaders
- be nominated as the major political leader in the city
- be consulted by the manager about political issues
- be most frequently involved in the administrative process in the city with involvement
  measured as oversight of
  and contact with
  administrative officials
  (Boynton & Wright, 1971).

Others have similarly pointed out
the informal powers exercised by
the mayor (Kuo, 1973; Sparrow,
Sparrow in particular pointed out
that the mayor can significantly
increase influence through
collaboration with other council
members. One study found the
mayor’s promotion or opposition to
policies—even those with
considerable council support—had a
measurable impact on the measure’s
ultimate success or demise (Kuo,
1973). Other variations on council-
manager plans create new
leadership roles for the mayor. For
instance, chairing the rules committee assigned to delegate policy deliberation to committees may
increase the mayor’s role (Newland, 1989).

### Characteristics of a weak mayor:

- The council is powerful, with both legislative and executive
  authority
- The mayor is not truly the chief executive, with limited
  power and/or no veto power
- The council can prevent the mayor from effectively
  supervising city administration
- There may be many administrative boards and commissions
  that operate independently from the government

### Characteristics of a strong mayor:

- The mayor is the chief executive officer, centralizing
  executive power
- The mayor directs the administrative structure, appointing
  and removing department heads
- While the council has legislative power, the mayor has veto
  power
- The council is relieved of day-to-day administration

National League of Cities accessed 4/24/07 at
www.nlc.org/about_cities

Evolutions in municipal forms of government

Today the strict policy-administration dichotomy model of municipal governance is
found untenable (Svara, 2001). Municipal powers, some recognize, can’t be distributed by design
(Schrager, 2006). The acceptance of a shared role by city managers is evident in the adoption of
Svara’s duality model in the primer for city managers, The Effective Local Government Manager.
There appear to be three distinct schools of thought on how to resolve the dissonance between
theory and reality: 1) redefine the role of the chief elected official to assert policymaking supremacy; 2) redefine the roles of both the chief elected and appointed official; 3) redefine the model so it reflects reality.

Those who advocate for a reassertion of the role of the strong mayor in council-manager cities see it as, on one hand, a benefit in reasserting the city’s right to bargain in the many layers of government created by federalism. In addition, Schragger (2006) pointed to the city manager’s lack of accountability to the populace. He argues for strong mayoral power as superior for accountability, transparency and populist energy and the ultimate path toward a healthy, vital polity. Historically, some have cast doubt on the ability of the council-manager form to manage conflicts (Banfield & Wilson, 1963). The methods for reasserting mayoral authority are numerous. Sparrow (1984) saw promise in the actions of San Diego Mayor Pete Wilson between 1971 and 1982. During his reign, the mayor unveiled methods to increase the chief executive’s role including having the mayor appoint the members and chair of each of four standing committees; creating staff positions to support the committees; determining which legislation requires committee review and which committee should review it; setting the agenda of the full city council; and becoming becomes the chair of the most powerful committee—the rules committee. Sparrow uses the study of one mayor’s reign to conclude that the city manager is losing power with emergency of strong-mayor, council-manager form.

Another response to the continued redefinition of the mayor’s and manager’s roles is seen in the merger of the two primary forms of city government. In a study of cities with populations of 100,000 and above between 1980 and 1994, the convergence of the council-manager and mayor-council forms in the use of district city council elections, directly elected mayors and professional management positions in mayor-council forms was found (Ebdon & Brucato, 2000; Fredrickson, Johnson & Wood, 2004). Adapted council-manager city is now preferred model for cities with more than 50,000, according to Ebdon & Brucato. See Appendices A and B for elements of traditional mayor-council and council-manager and current adapted forms. This convergence increases the power of mayors in council-manager while introducing the professional competencies of the chief administrative officers who work alongside mayor and council and relieve the mayor of day-to-day administrative duties (Schragger, 2006). The adaptations affect both the chief appointed official’s and the chief elected official’s responsibilities and spheres of influence.

The third option involves redefining the model to fit the practice. The approach has a sound basis in both empirical and anecdotal evidence. Findings show that the detailed features of these traditional models have been so mingled as to all but eliminate the importance of the formal designation of a city as either mayor-council or council-manager (Ebdon & Brucato, 2000). Nalbandian (1990) found policy leadership shared. Using data from 1987 ICMA survey found again that mayor and manager work as a team (Morgan & Watson, 1992). A less dichotomous, more shared framework, such as that espoused by Svara (1989) appears to better reflect reality and eliminate apparent conflicts. In the model, although elected officials are largely responsible for setting the mission and broad goals for city government while managers handle the management systems of the city, the officials share responsibility for policy and
implementation—the mid-level of policy activities. This model allows a policy-making role for managers and some management influence by the mayor and council. Elected officials and administrators maintain distinct roles based on their unique perspectives and values and the differences in their formal positions, but the functions they perform necessarily overlap (Svara, 2001).

**Hypotheses: detractors and enhancers of mayoral role**

Even if policy leadership is not a zero-sum game but rather a collaborative process with room for many actors (Simon, 1957), every actor can’t be equally involved in calling the plays. Subsequently, an increase in power of one policy actor would reduce another actor’s opportunity to lead. Given this hypothesis, an increased role of council members or the city manager in policymaking activities in council-manager cities would decrease mayoral leadership. The tenure of the policy actors within a community may expand that policymaking role or capability. Wikstrom (1979) found that to be the case with the longer tenure of mayors increasing the mayor’s policy role. That finding can be extrapolated to encompass the notion that all primary policy actors, including the city manager and council members, amass more influence the longer they serve as a community leader. Additionally, the number of primary policy actors—such as council members—in a city could diffuse policymaking authority and thus restrict the mayor’s ability to take the mantle of leadership. Council committees create coalitions of those policy actors that may be able to overcome the power of the chief elected official.

In exploring the relationship of these various factors with the leadership role of the mayor in council-manager cities, the primary hypotheses are:

- Positive relationship between direct election of the mayor and mayoral policy leadership activities
- Positive relationship between mayoral tenure and mayoral policy leadership
- Negative relationship between tenure of city manager and mayoral policy leadership
- Negative relationship between length of city manager in profession and mayoral policy leadership
- Negative relationship between tenure of council members and mayoral policy leadership
- Negative relationship between number of council members and mayoral policy leadership
- Negative relationship between council committees and mayoral policy leadership

**Research design**

The study uses a non-experimental design—a snapshot in time of the opinions of staff in a cross-section of council-manager cities in Washington gathered through an online survey. The bulk of survey questions probe relationships between the tenure and number of various policy actors and coalitions of policy actors to allow correlations to be drawn between the mayor’s leadership roles and those factors.
First Class - Population of 10,000 or more; adopted charter.

Second Class - Population over 1,500; no charter; not a code city.

Town - Population less than 1,500; not a code city; classification eliminated for any new towns in 1994.

Optional Municipal Code – Unincorporated areas with at least 1,500 population; over 10,000 may adopt a charter; form of broad statutory home rule authority; began in 1967.

(Municipal Research and Services Center, 2007)

Respondents answered a series of questions in the survey related to policy leadership roles. The majority of the survey questions are nominal, only requiring yes/no or number answers. The survey does not require precision, in that many of the questions have a range of years for tenure. One series of questions on specific policy leadership roles of the mayor, council and city manager required an ordinal response—a ranking of the level of involvement of the three city policy actors. The first question eliminated any cities that don’t operate under the council-manager form. Respondents choosing any other options were taken to the end of the survey. The survey gathered only one piece of demographic information—the position of the respondents. This question was included, in part, to sort out any elected official responses from the sample. However, population data could be determined based upon the number of council members indicated in each response. A copy of the instrument is reproduced in Appendix C. The survey tool was pre-tested before being distributed by three municipal government professionals and revised accordingly.

To ensure some potential for generalizability to other populations, many of the questions were replicated or adapted from previous surveys of the International City-County Management Association and other studies. Those studies helped operationalize the concepts of “policy” and “leadership.” The survey narrowed the field of possible representations of formal and informal leadership roles to a manageable number. Not included in the survey questions were some aspects proposed by Morgan and Watson (1992) and gathered in previous International City/County Management Association surveys, including giving the annual “state of the city” address. One less formally recognized leadership role—coordinating with citizen committees, boards and commissions—was included to round out the role of a strong policy actor in calling upon all sources of opposition or agreement, including elected officials, appointed officials, the media and committees. This inclusion is supported by the early work of Adrian (1958), which found that unofficial groups provided a significant amount of leadership in council-manager cities. Although various formal and informal roles might be weighted to give priority to more formal authority and activities, this study will give all leadership actions and influences equal weight.

Sample

The sample was a convenience sample of city managers and staff in Washington. By narrowing the study sample to one state, the impact of differing state laws governing forms of government is removed as a variable. Cities in Washington are allowed to operate under various forms based primarily on population. Those include the mayor-council, council-manager, commission and “optional municipal code” or a form of home rule. Cities may be mayor-council or council-manager cities and also code cities. See Appendix D for the breakdown of the various forms of government for Washington cities. Currently there are 10 first class cities, 16 second class cities, 73 towns, 181 code cities (one with a charter) and one unclassified city according to the Municipal Research and Services Center. To further reduce the variations in the sample and eliminate the impact of mayor-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Formal power</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Call special meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directly elected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appointment to boards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual message</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appointment of department heads</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prepare budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prepare agenda</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Informal power</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ceremonial representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confer frequently with manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State capitol representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequent media representative</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Morgan & Watson, 1992)
council forms and commission forms in comparing data, only council-manager cities were included in the sample. In total, 53 cities in Washington were organized as council-manager cities in May 2007. The list of council-manager cities follows in Appendix E.

However, variations do still exist within the sample. Because of the broader authorities provided to cities with their own charters and the optional municipal code cities, variations exist in how forms of government are exercised across the state, including in first-class council-manager cities. For example, in Vancouver the city attorney’s appointment is subject to council confirmation. In Yakima, the mayor is elected by the council for a two-year term. In Tacoma, Washington, the council does not confirm any appointments and the mayor is independently elected for a four-year term. The survey design takes into account these variations by asking whether a city is a "code" city.

Data analysis

The online survey comprised of 20 questions was sent to a sorted list to members of the Washington City-County Management Association members in council-manager cities and posted on a list serv. The survey was open to city staff and could be forwarded via an e-mail link to others, so a response rate can’t be determined. The survey was available from May 22 to June 20, 2007.

Staff from cities did respond through a list serv posting on the Washington City-County Management Association Web site and an e-mail distributed to municipal clerks in Washington.

During the time the survey was available, 100 respondents accessed it. Of those, 39 were from mayor-council cities and one from a commission form of government. Those respondents were not given access to other questions in the survey. The vast majority of respondents were from optional municipal code cities in Washington.

Of the 45 respondents from council-manager cities, the majority were city managers (18) or other city staff (12). The remainder of the respondents indicated they were deputy/assistant city managers (5), department directors (6) and assistants to the city manager/management analysts/interns (3). One respondent did not indicate a position or answer the majority of the questions. That respondent’s limited answers were deleted from the data set.

The majority of respondents (80%) were from optional municipal code cities in Washington. Six respondents were from first-class cities and three from second-class cities. The preliminary report of all responses is included in Appendix F.

Limitations

No control group or pre- and post-test assurances of validity or reliability are available for this non-experimental design. In addition, there is no method to determine if various staff members from a municipality—city managers, deputy city managers, city clerks, management interns and others—responded only once or more than once as all staff of council-manager cities were invited to participate. A “ballot box stuffing” prevention mechanism on the Web site did prevent individual users from taking the survey more than once. However, the survey does offer the advantage of the absence of any experimenter biases or other interactions of the experimenter in the process. The tool itself has face validity and content validity based upon its reliance on many previously tested instruments.

Due to the non-experimental nature of the data, descriptive statistics—not inferential—are the most appropriate findings. Data analysis will primarily use comparisons of results for the sample as a whole versus various subsets of responses to illustrate any variability in mayoral policy leadership activities to test the hypotheses.

Roles of mayor, council and city manager
The first question to be tested was who the primary policy actor in council-manager cities is—mayor, council or city manager. Conventional wisdom and research predicts that the council and city manager will be more dominant policy actors than the mayor in council-manager cities.

To analyze policymaking roles and factors influencing the role of the mayor in council-manager cities, several filters were used to generate comparisons to initial hypotheses. To turn the rankings (1 to 3) of the strength of the policy roles of the mayor, council and city manager into more easily interpreted data, the responses were summed and percentages derived. Using this method, the policy actor with the lowest involvement (rated a 1 by respondents) would receive a lower percentage of the overall policymaking role than the policy actor with the highest involvement (rated a 3 by respondents).

As indicated in the results below, the mayor was indeed perceived as a less forceful policy actor than the council and city manager. In five of the nine policy activities, the city manager was seen as the strongest policy actor. The remaining four policy roles are seen as primarily driven by the council. The mayor did not rate as the strongest policy actor in any of the policy activities. The findings support the hypothesis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>All Responses and Policy Role Strength</th>
<th>Mayor</th>
<th>Council</th>
<th>City Manager</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Advocating policy in community and with the media</td>
<td>31.73%</td>
<td>37.35%</td>
<td>30.92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Setting long-term fiscal priorities for the city</td>
<td>28.92%</td>
<td>37.35%</td>
<td>33.73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing strategies for future development of the city</td>
<td>29.72%</td>
<td>35.74%</td>
<td>34.54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building consensus with elected officials on policy issues</td>
<td>29.72%</td>
<td>36.14%</td>
<td>34.14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serving as intergovernmental liaison</td>
<td>32.53%</td>
<td>30.12%</td>
<td>37.35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Determining purpose and scope of city services</td>
<td>27.71%</td>
<td>33.33%</td>
<td>38.96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinating with citizen committees, boards and commissions</td>
<td>29.32%</td>
<td>34.14%</td>
<td>36.55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposing new policies</td>
<td>28.11%</td>
<td>35.74%</td>
<td>36.14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing city budget</td>
<td>27.71%</td>
<td>33.73%</td>
<td>38.55%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mayor tenure and authority

There were several questions in which insufficient data existed to draw any conclusions, however preliminary. For instance, one hypothesis was that the mayor's tenure might positively
relate to the policy leadership portrayed. However, findings were inconclusive, as no mayors had served four years or more in the sample.

Similarly, it was difficult to test the notion that mayors who are directly elected display more forceful policy leadership. The results were also not adequate to provide any delineation between mayors who rotate into the position over those directly elected by voters, as 41 of the 45 respondents indicated that the council selects the mayor from among its members. Only three indicated direct election of the mayor. However, the limited data indicated that policy roles change appreciably when the mayor is directly elected. Interestingly, the mayor’s role in setting long-term fiscal priorities, determining the purpose and scope of services and proposing new policies was appreciably lower than the average of all responses while the role of intergovernmental liaison was significantly stronger.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mayor Directly Elected and Policy Roles</th>
<th>Mayor</th>
<th>Council</th>
<th>City Manager</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Advocating policy in community and with the media</td>
<td>38.89%</td>
<td>33.33%</td>
<td>27.78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Setting long-term fiscal priorities for the city</td>
<td>16.67%</td>
<td>38.89%</td>
<td>44.44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing strategies for future development of the city</td>
<td>27.78%</td>
<td>33.33%</td>
<td>38.89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building consensus with elected officials on policy issues</td>
<td>33.33%</td>
<td>38.89%</td>
<td>27.78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serving as intergovernmental liaison</td>
<td>44.44%</td>
<td>16.67%</td>
<td>38.89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Determining purpose and scope of city services</td>
<td>16.67%</td>
<td>33.33%</td>
<td>50.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinating with citizen committees, boards and commissions</td>
<td>22.22%</td>
<td>33.33%</td>
<td>44.44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposing new policies</td>
<td>16.67%</td>
<td>38.89%</td>
<td>44.44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing city budget</td>
<td>27.78%</td>
<td>33.33%</td>
<td>38.89%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The mayor’s role in appointing members to citizen committees also warrants more study. Even though only three respondents indicated the mayor has that authority, the difference in the advocacy role is notable. This area—seemingly new territory for the study of city leadership—may show a relationship between citizen appointing authority and visible advocacy roles.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mayor Appoints to Citizen Committees and Policy Roles</th>
<th>Mayor</th>
<th>Council</th>
<th>City Manager</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Advocating policy in community and with the media</td>
<td>44.44%</td>
<td>22.22%</td>
<td>33.33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Setting long-term fiscal priorities for the city</td>
<td>22.22%</td>
<td>44.44%</td>
<td>33.33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing strategies for future development of the city</td>
<td>16.67%</td>
<td>44.44%</td>
<td>38.89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building consensus with elected officials on policy issues</td>
<td>33.33%</td>
<td>22.22%</td>
<td>44.44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serving as intergovernmental liaison</td>
<td>38.89%</td>
<td>16.67%</td>
<td>44.44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Determining purpose and scope of city services</td>
<td>22.22%</td>
<td>38.89%</td>
<td>38.89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinating with citizen committees, boards and commissions</td>
<td>22.22%</td>
<td>27.78%</td>
<td>50.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposing new policies</td>
<td>22.22%</td>
<td>38.89%</td>
<td>38.89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing city budget</td>
<td>33.33%</td>
<td>16.67%</td>
<td>50.00%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Council tenure and mayoral leadership
Another hypothesis to be probed was: Do council members with longer tenures decrease the power of the mayor? The assumption was that more veteran council members would decrease the policy leadership role of the mayor.

For the analysis of the impact of council tenure on mayoral leadership, responses with one or more "not sure" answers regarding the tenure of council members were removed, as well as any that didn't rank policy leadership roles of the mayor, council and city manager. Findings were limited to cities with 5 or 7 council members. The majority had 7 council positions.

Data was pulled for council members who, in total, had an average of 1-2 years on the council compared to 3-4 years on the council. As indicated in the graph below, it did appear that relatively younger councils rely more heavily on the mayor and less on the city manager, whereas council members with average experience ranges from three to four years tended to lean more heavily on the city manager and less on the mayor. This finding comports with the hypothesis.

![Council Tenure and Policy Roles](image)

**Council membership, committees and mayoral authority**

Another question posed in this study was: Do larger councils take influence away from the mayor? The hypothesis was that larger councils would dilute mayoral influence. However, it would be difficult to assess the impact of the size of the city council on the mayor's policymaking role, given that 93% of respondents had councils comprised of seven members. Only a few very small cities had five members and only very large cities warrant a nine-member council. Therefore, no analysis was done on the hypothesis that larger councils dilute the policymaking role of the mayor.

In addition, in only three responses did council committees exist, making it difficult to judge whether council standing committees weaken the role of the mayor in a council-manager city, as expected. Despite the dearth of data, the impact on the policy roles was significant enough to note. Across the board, the mayor’s role in policymaking was stronger in cities with council committees by as much as nearly 15%, as in the case of developing strategies for future development of the city. The mayor’s policy role as rated by respondents increased significantly when compared to overall data. The impact of that increased role appears to felt by both city managers and the council. However, the bulk of the difference is seen in the council’s role in policymaking, which was weakened considerably.
Developing strategies for future development of the city
Building consensus with elected officials on policy issues
Serving as intergovernmental liaison
Determining purpose and scope of city services
Coordinating with citizen committees, boards and commissions
Proposing new policies
Developing city budget

City manager’s expertise and tenure and mayoral role

The final question to be analyzed was whether the tenure of the city manager negatively impacts the policy leadership of the mayor. For city managers with 21+ years of experience in the profession compared to all city managers in the survey pool, the impact appeared to be negligible. However, the role of advocating policy in the community, setting long-term fiscal priorities and building consensus with elected officials on policy showed less perceived involvement by long-term city managers. In those cases, it appears that the city manager deferred that role to the council. Therefore, the findings split more finely with some policymaking roles increasing for the mayor with professional, experienced city managers and some decreasing.
For city managers with 8+ years serving a city, policy roles also differed in some arenas. Most significantly, the role of the city manager in advocating policy in the community was significantly lower, as was building consensus with elected officials. Stronger policy roles for city managers with longer tenure in one city included proposing new policies, developing the budget and serving as an intergovernmental liaison. The mayor’s role in advocating policy and building consensus with elected officials increased significantly to fill the gap left by the city manager’s retreat from those areas. In other areas, however, the mayor’s role decreased significantly—in proposing new policies and developing the city budget, for instance. Similar to the findings for city managers with many years in the field, the data is split among various policy roles with some supporting the hypothesis that city managers with more years in a position take stronger roles and some countering that proposition.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City Manager 8+ Years in Same City</th>
<th>Mayor</th>
<th>Council</th>
<th>City Manager</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Advocating policy in community and with the media</td>
<td>39.58%</td>
<td>37.50%</td>
<td>22.92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Setting long-term fiscal priorities for the city</td>
<td>27.08%</td>
<td>43.75%</td>
<td>29.17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing strategies for future development of the city</td>
<td>22.92%</td>
<td>43.75%</td>
<td>33.33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building consensus with elected officials on policy issues</td>
<td>39.58%</td>
<td>35.42%</td>
<td>25.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serving as intergovernmental liaison</td>
<td>33.33%</td>
<td>27.08%</td>
<td>39.58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Determining purpose and scope of city services</td>
<td>25.00%</td>
<td>37.50%</td>
<td>37.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinating with citizen committees, boards and commissions</td>
<td>25.00%</td>
<td>37.50%</td>
<td>37.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposing new policies</td>
<td>22.92%</td>
<td>33.33%</td>
<td>43.75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing city budget</td>
<td>22.92%</td>
<td>31.25%</td>
<td>45.83%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although not a hypothesis in this study, results were pulled for city managers only to test how they perceived their roles and whether their responses might skew the data. Results from the city managers on their policymaking roles compared to the mayor’s and council members’ closely paralleled the results from all respondents. However, the city managers consistently rated themselves a couple of percentage points lower. In addition, the city managers appeared to perceive a more even splitting of policymaking roles between the mayor and council, as evidenced by the higher scores given to the mayor.
City Managers Only

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Mayor</th>
<th>Council</th>
<th>City Manager</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Advocating policy in community and with the media</td>
<td>34.26%</td>
<td>35.19%</td>
<td>30.56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Setting long-term fiscal priorities for the city</td>
<td>33.33%</td>
<td>37.04%</td>
<td>29.63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing strategies for future development of the city</td>
<td>32.41%</td>
<td>36.11%</td>
<td>31.48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building consensus with elected officials on policy issues</td>
<td>33.33%</td>
<td>36.11%</td>
<td>30.56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serving as intergovernmental liaison</td>
<td>34.26%</td>
<td>28.70%</td>
<td>37.04%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Determining purpose and scope of city services</td>
<td>32.41%</td>
<td>31.48%</td>
<td>36.11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinating with citizen committees, boards and commissions</td>
<td>32.41%</td>
<td>33.33%</td>
<td>34.26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposing new policies</td>
<td>33.33%</td>
<td>32.41%</td>
<td>34.26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing city budget</td>
<td>29.63%</td>
<td>35.19%</td>
<td>35.19%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Conclusions

Washington’s council-manager cities appear to operate under policymaking dynamics similar to other reformed North American cities with distinct executive and legislative roles. The survey data supports the theory that policymaking roles including budget development, policy initiation and advocacy are shared between the mayor, council, and city manager. The findings support the widespread adoption of the adapted form foreseen and documented by academicians including Morgan and Watson (1992). In no policymaking arena did any one player or group of players exert more than 44% of the policy leadership power. However, division of power is not equal. The mayor is not seen as the dominant policy actor and may be somewhat inconspicuous (Adrian, 1958). As suggested by Boynton and Wright (1971), the council is perceived to perform a stronger policymaking authority than the mayor. The city manager also plays a very visible and vital policy role in leading the policy.

The impact of the shared city leadership role is unclear. Many believe that the mayor’s ability to join with other council members (Boynton & Wright, 1971; Sparrow, 1984) to create a dominant coalition of policy actors is a significant strength—and one that wouldn’t be reflected in these survey results. In essence, the mayor could still be a “first among equals” and something more than a ribbon cutter but less than a stand-alone policy maker (Svara, 1987). Mayors in council-manager cities may well still serve to improve performance of the system as a whole (Svara, 1990). Some of the survey results seem to support that theory. For instance from the limited data council committees appear to increase the mayor’s policy leadership role—in direct opposition to the original hypothesis. This may in fact support the idea of a “pyramiding of power” in council-manager cities whereby mayors join forces with other council members to forward policies. From an outsider, it may appear that the council is leading policy whereas the mayor may in fact exert more influence than is immediately recognizable. Pulling like-minded council members together in a council committee structure would aid, not detract, from the mayor’s efforts to build coalitions in that setting.
It does appear that mayors who are directly elected may enjoy more leadership authority with other governmental bodies than others. Other elected officials may respect the fact that the mayor faced the same vetting at the polls that they have and thus enjoys popular support. Overt constituent support may give weight to the mayor's voice in council-manager cities. Mayors who appoint members to citizen committees also may enjoy a higher level of influence based upon a stronger connection to influential citizens in the community, as shown by the advocacy role. Again, the results need more study but may indicate the mayor's role in council-manager cities as being strongly dependent on the officeholder's ability to create coalitions with other dominant policy actors, both inside city hall and in the community.

The differences in policymaking roles based upon the tenure of council members were intriguing. Whereas fledgling council members appeared to rely more heavily on the mayor, those with three to four years of experience seemed to share the policymaking authority more readily with the city manager. Although it's difficult to surmise why this might be, it could be that council members first seek the guidance of the lead elected official in learning the legislative process before turning to the lead appointed official for more advice in drafting and forwarding policies. Or it is possible that the mayor and council members, after an initial honeymoon period, end up on opposite sides of a policy issue and part ways. It may also simply be an indication of the learning curve, whereby council members determine over their first two years in office that the city manager's role in drafting and forwarding policy is stronger than originally perceived.

In addition, long-term city managers appear to back off certain overt policy leadership roles and allow the mayor and council to take the lead. Although some roles, such as budgeting—a legislated role for the city manager—may be stronger for those with longer terms as a city manager or in a city, other roles indicate shrinkage. Given that policy conflicts are a lead cause for city managers choosing to terminate their relationship with a city—and also is a lead cause of termination by councils—it may be that city managers consciously try to become a shadow player in local politics. While safeguarding and building roles that have general acceptance, the city manager may choose to discontinue or subvert other roles that become key points of friction. Those appear to be the roles that would be most visible to constituents, such as advocating in the media. Showing respect for the mayor's and council members' relationships with constituencies may be a core survival tactic.

**Areas for Further Study**

To further probe the relationships of various factors and the mayor's policymaking role in council-manager cities, a more robust sample is needed. In addition, the informal policy leadership roles of the mayor—such as advocating policy in the media and community and serving as an intergovernmental liaison—appear to be less influenced by variances in other factors and deserve more study.

Other questions on the mayoral role in council-manager cities include:

- Does dominant political party affiliation affect the policy roles undertaken by the mayor?
- Does the content of a policy or its alignment with party politics influence the role of the mayor?
- Do term limits influence the policymaking dynamics?
- Does the presence of mayor- and council-dedicated staff and resources influence policymaking roles?
- Do full-time mayors exert more policy influence than part-time mayors?
- Does the council as Ridley (1958) asserts seldom initiate policy, preferring to have citizen committees and groups lead?
- What is the influence of ward- or district-elected council members on mayoral influence?
- Does the content of policy—traditional versus social policies—influence the role played by the mayor and council, as posited by Boynton & Wright (1971)?
However, one has to wonder if all the time and energy spent discussing policymaking roles in council-manager or mayor-council cities misses the point. City managers' policy roles are most often set by the mayor and council themselves (Loveridge, 1968; Kammerer, 1964)—not surprisingly since the city manager serves at the pleasure of the mayor and council. That is even more accurate in strong mayor cities. One final area for further study is how the mayor and council members' understanding of their roles and the city manager's role in policymaking are similar or differ in council-manager cities.

In addition, there are a whole host of questions regarding the difference between policy roles of chief administrative officers in mayor-council cities and city managers in council-manager cities that deserve more study. For example:

- Do chief administrative officers experience less intervention in day-to-day administration than city managers?
- Are mayors who have the power to appoint the chief administrative officer stronger policy actors?
- Is there more or less overlap between policymaking roles in cities with CAOs versus cities with city managers?

**Implications**

Sound governance relies on a somewhat unified—or at least understood—leadership structure. Policymaking in local government requires the mayor, council and city manager to see their roles as complementary, not confrontational. The International City-County Management Association assigns certain duties to the mayor or council chair:

- Presiding at council meetings
- Serving as a spokesperson for the community
- Facilitating communication and understanding between elected and appointed officials
- Assisting the council in setting goals and advocating policy decisions
- Promoting and defending the community
- Serving as a key representative in intergovernmental relations

The future of council-manager government is based on complementary roles for mayor, council and manager. Banovetz (1994) posits that city managers will “hunker down” if policy-making roles are not compatible between elected and appointed officials. Indeed, a main frustration for city managers is the role conflict with council over policymaking and “power prerogatives” (Carrell, 1962). As evidenced by the responses regarding city managers with history in the profession, wise appointed officials limit their policy leadership roles to areas less likely to create conflicts, including budget development and proposing new policies. One city manager, writing in the professional association magazine for city managers, advised his peers not to insert themselves into policy and community leadership roles even if a council void exists. He also cautioned his cohorts to “avoid the limelight” (Duggan, 1991).

City managers may be well served by leaving the more prominent public roles, such as acting as intergovernmental liaison and advocacy to the mayor and elected officials in council-manager cities. By doing so, they may well establish the policy development and management team of mayor, council and manager envisioned by the International City-County Management Association (International City-County Management Association, 2007).

The responsibility for defining appropriate roles lies with all of the actors—manager, mayor and council members. One of the first jobs of a new city manager is to open discussions with the mayor and council members to create a shared understanding of policymaking and executive
roles that will help avoid any future conflicts. Managers also have a real opportunity to avoid push-and-pull relations with the mayor. Although "weak" mayors may struggle with their lack of authority, seasoned city managers can help elevate that role by including the mayor in on discussions about policy early on and enlisting the assistance of the lead elected official in building consensus on policy recommendations forwarded from municipal staff.

In the end, all of the debate concerning policy and administrative roles appear to be headed for a positive result: Current municipal forms seek to blend responsiveness and democratic leadership with the elements of efficiency and professional competence, bringing the best of both forms to all types of cities.
## Comparing/Contrasting the Mayor-Council and Council-Manager Forms of Government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Mayor-Council</th>
<th>Council-Manager</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legislative authority</td>
<td>Council</td>
<td>Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive authority</td>
<td>Elected mayor</td>
<td>Appointed manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selection of CEO</td>
<td>Popularly elected</td>
<td>Appointed by council on the basis of experience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Removal of CEO</td>
<td>Recall election</td>
<td>Removed by a majority vote of the council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenure of executive</td>
<td>4-year term</td>
<td>Indefinite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenure of council</td>
<td>4-year term</td>
<td>4-year term</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appointment of</td>
<td>Mayor (with council confirmation if provided)</td>
<td>Manager (no council confirmation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>department heads</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Removal of</td>
<td>Mayor</td>
<td>Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>department heads</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veto</td>
<td>Mayor</td>
<td>Manager has no veto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy development</td>
<td>Mayor can propose</td>
<td>Manager can recommend</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy implementation</td>
<td>Mayor</td>
<td>Manager</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Underlying principles
- Separation of powers
- Political leadership
- Strong central executive

- Separation of politics from administration
- Promotion of economy and efficiency through professional management
- Strong central executive
Appendix B
Adapted Forms of Municipal Government

Ebdon & Brucato, 2000, excerpted from Table 1 page 24.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mayor-Council Traditional</th>
<th>Mayor-Council Adapted</th>
<th>Council Manager Traditional</th>
<th>Council Manager Adapted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mayor directly elected</td>
<td>Mayor directly elected</td>
<td>Mayor selected by council</td>
<td>Mayor directly elected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most council elected by district</td>
<td>Council elected by district, at-large or mixed</td>
<td>Most council elected at-large</td>
<td>Council elected by district, at-large, or mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No CAO</td>
<td>Likely to have CAO</td>
<td>Has CAO</td>
<td>Has CAO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayor is not on council</td>
<td>Mayor is not on council</td>
<td>Mayor is on council</td>
<td>Mayor is on council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayor has veto power</td>
<td>Mayor has veto power</td>
<td>Mayor does not have veto power</td>
<td>Mayor may have veto power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayor full-time</td>
<td>Mayor full-time</td>
<td>Mayor part-time</td>
<td>Mayor is usually part-time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayor has staff</td>
<td>Mayor has staff</td>
<td>Mayor does not have staff</td>
<td>Mayor does not have staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council full-time</td>
<td>Council full-time or part-time</td>
<td>Council is part-time</td>
<td>Council is part-time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council has staff</td>
<td>Council may have staff</td>
<td>Council does not have staff</td>
<td>Council does not have staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisan or nonpartisan</td>
<td>Partisan or nonpartisan elections</td>
<td>Nonpartisan elections</td>
<td>Usually nonpartisan elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department heads report to mayor</td>
<td>Department heads report to mayor</td>
<td>Department heads report to CAO</td>
<td>Department heads report to CAO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayor serves as CAO</td>
<td>Mayor appoints and terminates CAO without consent of council</td>
<td>Council appoints and terminates city manager</td>
<td>Council appoints and terminates city manager</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix C
Qualitrics

**Default Question Block**

Thank you for participating in this short survey. Individual responses are anonymous. Please complete your survey by June 20th.

The questionnaire explores the policy leadership activities of mayors in council-manager cities. The survey tests for relationships between the mayor's leadership role and various factors including the tenure and number of council members; the tenure and experience of the city manager; and the presence of council standing committees.

Please share this survey with others who serve in Washington council-manager cities.

The survey should take you no more than 10 minutes to complete. If you choose to stop before completing the survey, it will save your results and you may return to it at anytime before June 21st. You may skip most of the questions if you're unsure, but please fill in as many answers as you can.

Thank you.

Gwendolyn Vocelpol
Assistant to the City Manager
City of Tacoma

What is the form of government does your city have?

(Move your cursor over the selections below until the appropriate option is highlighted. Choose the button with the double-right arrow to proceed to the next question. You may also choose the back button with the double-left arrow at any point to return to the previous question screen.)

- Council-Manager
- Mayor-Council
- Other

What is the classification of your city? You may look up your city at http://www.nrec.org/cityprofiles/citylist.aspx.

- First class
- Second class
- Optional municipal code or "code" city
- Not sure

How is your mayor selected?

- Vote on direct
- Council selects from among its members
- The council member receiving the most votes in the general election becomes the mayor
- Council members rotate into the position of mayor
- Other
- Not sure

How long has your mayor served in that role?

- 1-3 years
- 4-7 years
- 7+ years
- Not sure

Under what circumstances does the mayor have the authority to vote in a council meeting?

- On all issues
- Only to break a tie
- To break a tie and other reasons
- Never
- Other
- Not sure

Does the mayor have the authority to veto council-passed measures?
If the mayor has the right to veto, is a super majority of the council required to overturn it?

Yes
No
Not sure

Who appoints your city manager?

Mayor
Council
Combination of mayor and council

How long has your city manager served as the chief executive officer in your city?

1-3 years
4-7 years
8+ years

How many years has your city manager been a professional administrator, e.g. city manager, county administrator, assistant city/county manager, deputy director? (Estimates allowed.)
Are any of the city manager’s department head or municipal judge appointments subject to confirmation by council?

Yes
No
Not sure

Who appoints citizens to serve on committees, boards and commissions of the city?

Mayor
Recommended by mayor and appointed by council
Mayor with advice of council
Council
Other
Not sure

Please rank the overall involvement of the mayor, city council and city manager in the areas listed below with 1 = lowest involvement to 3 = highest involvement. This is a forced choice, so in each row you should only have one position rated as a 1, one as a 2, and one as a 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mayor</th>
<th>Council</th>
<th>City Manager</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Developing city budget</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposing new policies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing strategies for future development of the city</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building consensus with elected officials on policy issues</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Coordinating with citizen committees, boards and commissions

Setting long-term fiscal priorities for the city

Advocating policy in community and with the media

Serving as intergovernmental liaison

Determining purpose and scope of city services

Does your city have council standing committees that deliberate on policy issues?

Yes
No

Who appoints members of the council standing committees?

Mayor
Mayor recommends and council approves
Mayor with advice of council
Council
Not sure

Is there a rules committee that assigns legislation to the council standing committees for review?

How is the chair of the rules committee selected?

- Mayor serves in that role
- Mayor appoints
- Mayor recommends and council appoints
- Council members and mayor rotate
- Council appoints
- Not sure

How many council members does your city have?

- 5
- 7
- 9

Please estimate how long your council members have served.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>1-2 years</th>
<th>3-4 years</th>
<th>5-7 years</th>
<th>8 years or more</th>
<th>Not sure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Position 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position 2</td>
<td>1-2 years</td>
<td>3-4 years</td>
<td>5-7 years</td>
<td>8 years or more</td>
<td>Not sure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position 3</td>
<td>1-2 years</td>
<td>3-4 years</td>
<td>5-7 years</td>
<td>8 years or more</td>
<td>Not sure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position 4</td>
<td>1-2 years</td>
<td>3-4 years</td>
<td>5-7 years</td>
<td>8 years or more</td>
<td>Not sure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position 5</td>
<td>1-2 years</td>
<td>3-4 years</td>
<td>5-7 years</td>
<td>8 years or more</td>
<td>Not sure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position 6</td>
<td>1-2 years</td>
<td>3-4 years</td>
<td>5-7 years</td>
<td>8 years or more</td>
<td>Not sure</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position 7</th>
<th>1-2 years</th>
<th>3-4 years</th>
<th>5-7 years</th>
<th>8 years or more</th>
<th>Not sure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Position 8</td>
<td>1-2 years</td>
<td>3-4 years</td>
<td>5-7 years</td>
<td>8 years or more</td>
<td>Not sure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position 9</td>
<td>1-2 years</td>
<td>3-4 years</td>
<td>5-7 years</td>
<td>8 years or more</td>
<td>Not sure</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What best describes your position?

- City manager
- Assistant/deputy city manager
- Department director
- Assistant to the city manager/management analyst
- Other city staff
- Elected official

### Appendix D
Cities in Washington
Municipal Research and Services Center

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Council-Manager</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Airway Heights</td>
<td>4640</td>
<td>Spokane</td>
<td>Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Battle Ground</td>
<td>14960</td>
<td>Clark</td>
<td>Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Bellevue</td>
<td>115500</td>
<td>King</td>
<td>Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Blaine</td>
<td>4240</td>
<td>Whatcom</td>
<td>Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Bothell</td>
<td>31000</td>
<td>King/Snohomish</td>
<td>Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Burien</td>
<td>31040</td>
<td>King</td>
<td>Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Carnation</td>
<td>1900</td>
<td>King</td>
<td>Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Centralia</td>
<td>15340</td>
<td>Lewis</td>
<td>Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Chehalis</td>
<td>6990</td>
<td>Lewis</td>
<td>Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Covington</td>
<td>16610</td>
<td>King</td>
<td>Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Des Moines</td>
<td>28960</td>
<td>King</td>
<td>Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Edgewood</td>
<td>9460</td>
<td>Pierce</td>
<td>Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Ellensburg</td>
<td>16700</td>
<td>Kittitas</td>
<td>Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Federal Way</td>
<td>85800</td>
<td>King</td>
<td>Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Fife</td>
<td>4855</td>
<td>Pierce</td>
<td>Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>Fircrest</td>
<td>6080</td>
<td>Pierce</td>
<td>Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>Kelso</td>
<td>11820</td>
<td>Cowlitz</td>
<td>Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>Kenmore</td>
<td>19290</td>
<td>King</td>
<td>Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.</td>
<td>Kennewick</td>
<td>60410</td>
<td>Benton</td>
<td>Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.</td>
<td>Kirkland</td>
<td>45740</td>
<td>King</td>
<td>Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.</td>
<td>Lacey</td>
<td>33180</td>
<td>Thurston</td>
<td>Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.</td>
<td>Lakewood</td>
<td>58850</td>
<td>Pierce</td>
<td>Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23.</td>
<td>Longview</td>
<td>35430</td>
<td>Cowlitz</td>
<td>Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24.</td>
<td>Maple Valley</td>
<td>17870</td>
<td>King</td>
<td>Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.</td>
<td>Medina</td>
<td>2930</td>
<td>King</td>
<td>Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. Mercer Island</td>
<td>21710</td>
<td>King</td>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Council-Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. Mill Creek</td>
<td>14320</td>
<td>Snohomish</td>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Council-Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28. Moses Lake</td>
<td>16340</td>
<td>Grant</td>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Council-Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29. Mountlake Terrace</td>
<td>20390</td>
<td>Snohomish</td>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Council-Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30. Newcastle</td>
<td>8890</td>
<td>King</td>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Council-Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31. Normandy Park</td>
<td>6385</td>
<td>King</td>
<td>Second</td>
<td>Council-Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32. Ocean Shores</td>
<td>4385</td>
<td>Grays Harbor</td>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Council-Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33. Olympia</td>
<td>43330</td>
<td>Thurston</td>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Council-Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34. Pasco</td>
<td>44190</td>
<td>Franklin</td>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Council-Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35. Port Angeles</td>
<td>18640</td>
<td>Clallam</td>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Council-Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36. Port Townsend</td>
<td>8745</td>
<td>Jefferson</td>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Council-Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37. Puyallup</td>
<td>35830</td>
<td>Pierce</td>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Council-Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38. Richland</td>
<td>43520</td>
<td>Benton</td>
<td>First</td>
<td>Council-Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39. Ridgefield</td>
<td>2630</td>
<td>Clark</td>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Council-Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40. Sammamish</td>
<td>38640</td>
<td>King</td>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Council-Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41. SeaTac</td>
<td>25140</td>
<td>King</td>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Council-Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42. Sequim</td>
<td>4730</td>
<td>Clallam</td>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Council-Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43. Shoreline</td>
<td>52500</td>
<td>King</td>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Council-Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44. Snohomish</td>
<td>8700</td>
<td>Snohomish</td>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Council-Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45. Spokane Valley</td>
<td>85010</td>
<td>Spokane</td>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Council-Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46. Sunnyside</td>
<td>14710</td>
<td>Yakima</td>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Council-Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47. Tacoma</td>
<td>198100</td>
<td>Pierce</td>
<td>First</td>
<td>Council-Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48. Toppenish</td>
<td>9000</td>
<td>Yakima</td>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Council-Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49. University Place</td>
<td>30980</td>
<td>Pierce</td>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Council-Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50. Vancouver</td>
<td>154800</td>
<td>Clark</td>
<td>First</td>
<td>Council-Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51. Walla</td>
<td>30630</td>
<td>Walla Walla</td>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Council-Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walla</td>
<td>52. Woodinville</td>
<td>10140</td>
<td>King</td>
<td>Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53. Yakima</td>
<td>79480</td>
<td>Yakima</td>
<td>First</td>
<td>Council-Manager</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Forms of Government and Percentage of Incorporated Population of Washington Cities - 1940 to 2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Mayor-Council</th>
<th>Council-Manager</th>
<th>Commission</th>
<th>Total No. of Cities</th>
<th>Total Inc. Pop</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>% of Inc. Pop.</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>% of Inc. Pop.</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>49.8%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>43.8%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>44.8%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix F
Survey Results

What is the classification of your city? You may look up your city at http://www.mrsc.org/cityprofiles/citylist.aspx.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>Response</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First class</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second class</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Optional municipal code or &quot;code&quot; city</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not sure</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>44</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

How is your mayor selected?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>Response</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Voters elect directly</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council selects from among its members</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The council member receiving the most votes in the general election becomes the mayor</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council members rotate into the position of mayor</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not sure</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>44</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

How long has your mayor served in that role?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>Response</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-3 years</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-7 years</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7+ years</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not sure</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>44</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Under what circumstances does the mayor have the authority to vote in a council meeting?
### Does the mayor have the authority to veto council-passed measures?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>Response</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not sure</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>44</strong></td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### If the mayor has the right to veto, is a super majority of the council required to overturn it?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>Response</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not sure</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>4</strong></td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Who appoints your city manager?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>Response</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mayor</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combination of mayor and council</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>44</strong></td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### How long has your city manager served as the chief executive officer in your city?
How many years has your city manager been a professional administrator, e.g. city manager, county administrator, assistant city/county manager, deputy director? (Estimates allowed.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>Response</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-3 years</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-7 years</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8+ years</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Are any of the city manager's department head or municipal judge appointments subject to confirmation by council?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>Response</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not sure</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Who appoints citizens to serve on committees, boards and commissions of the city?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>Response</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mayor</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommended by mayor and appointed by council</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayor with advice of council</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not sure</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please rank the overall involvement of the mayor, city council and city manager in the areas listed below with 1 = lowest involvement to 3 = highest involvement.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Mayor</th>
<th>Council</th>
<th>City Manager</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Advocating policy in community and with the media</td>
<td>31.73%</td>
<td>37.35%</td>
<td>30.92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building consensus with elected officials on policy issues</td>
<td>29.72%</td>
<td>36.14%</td>
<td>34.14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing strategies for future development of the city</td>
<td>29.72%</td>
<td>35.74%</td>
<td>34.54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serving as intergovernmental liaison</td>
<td>32.53%</td>
<td>30.12%</td>
<td>37.35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activity</td>
<td>Mayor (%)</td>
<td>Council (%)</td>
<td>City Manager (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Setting long-term fiscal priorities for the city</td>
<td>28.92</td>
<td>37.35</td>
<td>33.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinating with citizen committees, boards and commissions</td>
<td>29.32</td>
<td>34.14</td>
<td>36.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposing new policies</td>
<td>28.11</td>
<td>35.74</td>
<td>36.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Determining purpose and scope of city services</td>
<td>27.71</td>
<td>33.33</td>
<td>38.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing city budget</td>
<td>27.71</td>
<td>33.73</td>
<td>38.55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Does your city have council standing committees that deliberate on policy issues?  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>Response</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
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</table>

### Who appoints members of the council standing committees?  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>Response</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mayor</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayor recommends and council approves</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayor with advice of council</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not sure</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Answer</td>
<td>Response</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not sure</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**How is the chair of the rules committee selected?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>Response</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mayor serves in that role</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayor appoints</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayor recommends and council appoints</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council members and mayor rotate</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council appoints</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not sure</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**How many council members does your city have?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>Response</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
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</table>

**Please estimate how long your council members have served.**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Label 1</th>
<th>Count 1</th>
<th>Label 2</th>
<th>Count 2</th>
<th>Label 3</th>
<th>Count 3</th>
<th>Label 4</th>
<th>Count 4</th>
<th>Label 5</th>
<th>Count 5</th>
<th>Mean</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>1-2 years</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3-4 years</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5-7 years</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8 years or more</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Not sure</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position</td>
<td>1-2 years</td>
<td>3-4 years</td>
<td>5-7 years</td>
<td>8 years or more</td>
<td>Not sure</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Variance</td>
<td>Standard Deviation</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.83</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.83</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.95</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.77</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
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<td>2.60</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.56</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.39</td>
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<th>Position 1</th>
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<th>Position 3</th>
<th>Position 4</th>
<th>Position 5</th>
<th>Position 6</th>
<th>Position 7</th>
<th>Position 8</th>
<th>Position 9</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>2.77</td>
<td>2.95</td>
<td>2.48</td>
<td>2.83</td>
<td>2.39</td>
<td>2.56</td>
<td>2.60</td>
<td>2.83</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variance</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>1.37</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>1.49</td>
<td>1.52</td>
<td>1.37</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard Deviation</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>44</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>Responses</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
References


DATE: April 1, 2015
TO: Charter Review Committee
FROM: Gregory G. Diaz, City Attorney
SUBJECT: Consideration of Charter Review Committee’s Calendar and Work Plan

RECOMMENDATION:
That the Charter Review Committee take action as it deems appropriate.

DISCUSSION:
At the March 11, 2015 Charter Review Committee meeting, the Committee voted to request that authorization be sought from the City Council to retain an expert/consultant to review city council districts, voting rights, and options relating thereto; to seek clarification from the City Council on the assigned task relating to city council districts, and finally to include certain other matters within the charge to the Committee. Staff had reserved time on the City Council’s April 13, 2015 agenda for this item. Because of other items on the April 13, 2015 agenda, the request from the Charter Committee has been moved to the April 20, 2015 City Council meeting.

In light of this, staff is requesting that the Committee determine if it desires to have a May meeting or wait until June to have the next regular meeting. The next topic for discussion at the Committee is districting and the options related thereto. If it is not known until April 20th what the City Council’s direction is on the expert/consultant, this will make either preparing materials for the Committee’s May 13, 2015 meeting very tight or not give the expert/consultant time to prepare. Staff is willing to do so; however, given other issues and workload, is concerned about duplicating work that the expert/consultant would be doing. If the May 13th meeting were canceled, the issue of districts would be presented at the Committee’s June 10th meeting.

Staff is looking for the Committee’s direction on how to proceed on this issue.
DATE: April 1, 2015

TO: Charter Review Committee

FROM: Gregory G. Diaz, City Attorney

SUBJECT: Committee Requests for Information Relating to the City Council Districts and Options

Recommendation:

Members of the City Charter Review Committee may indicate the types of information that they would find useful and/or helpful in determining and preparing for the May 13 and June 10, 2015 Charter Review Committee Meetings where the topic is scheduled to be whether or not the City should change its current at-large method of electing Members of the City Council to City Council Districts where candidates run only in the district they live and are voted on only by voters in that District and what other options are available.

DISCUSSION:

At the Committee's First Meeting, Staff indicated we would include on every agenda the topic for the next meeting to provide Committee Members with the opportunity to request specific types of information you would find useful or helpful in addressing the next topic. At your last meeting, March 11, 2015, staff provided an opportunity for Members of the Committee to indicate what information they would find useful and helpful in making a recommendation on whether or not the City should switch from at-large to geographic districts.

Staff is currently preparing the following information for the Committee:

--Maps:
-Showing the City's racial/ethnic composition based on 2010 census data
-Showing where City Council Members have lived for as far back as we can obtain data to help determine if City Council Members are concentrated in one part of the City or spread throughout the City
--Racial/Ethnic Break Down of:
   --Mayor and City Council Members
   --Candidates
   --Attempt to go as far back as 1975

--Options:
   --Retain at-large system
   --Geographic Districts
   --"Wards" – Where you must live in the district, but be elected by the voters of the entire city
   --Mix of Districts and At-Large City Council Districts
   --Cumulative Voting

--Staff Analysis:
   --Federal and California Voting Rights Act, what is required and is the City vulnerable to a legal challenge.

If there is information that the Committee would find helpful or useful that is not included above, it would be helpful to staff to identify this now so that it can be gathered in time for your meetings.